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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The threat of global war subsided with the end of the Cold War, but global 
uncertainty and instability did not. Early predictions about the future after the 
Cold War were global peace, prosperity and extensive multi-national 
collaborations. However, this was too optimistic for a world that can easily reach 
extremes of madness. Problems that had been suppressed emerged in regions 
that previously had been stable during the Cold War. With the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, regional conflicts, ethnic cleansing, poverty and illnesses became the 
major issues for international peace and security. 
Peace operations during the Cold War could be described as deploying 
long-lasting multi-national forces, under restrictive rules of engagement, into 
buffer zones between rival nations to oversee implementation of a peace accord. 
The number of the peace operations increased in number and form after the Cold 
War. Since 1948, the United Nations conducted 60 peace operations, 42 of 
which started after 1990. In May 2005, there were 16 ongoing operations around 
the world.1 The graphic in Figure 1 shows the operations begun since the 1990s.  
 
1 United Nation Peacekeeping Operation, retrieved July 17, 2005 from  
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm  
 
Figure 1.   UN Peace Operations after the Cold War2 
Just as the problems cover a broad spectrum, so do the types of 
operations. Peace operations are generally categorized into three groups: 
peacekeeping (PK), peace enforcement (PE) and support to diplomacy.3  
Peacekeeping operations are the “military operations undertaken with the 
consent of all major parties to the dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate 
implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, etc.) and support diplomatic 
efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.”4  Peace enforcement operations 
are “the applications of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to 
international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions 
designed to maintain or restore peace and order.”5  The third category is defined 
as “military support of diplomatic efforts that improves the chances for success in 
the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating 
                                            
2 The graphic is adopted from Operation Timeline, retrieved July 18, 2005 from 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/timeline.html, and modified to show the 
operations started after 1990. 
3 Department of the Army, Stability Operations and Support Operations, Field Manual 3-07, 
(20 Feb 2003), p 4-2. 




                                           
resolve to achieve viable political settlements.”6 Further explanations of these 
operations are beyond the scope of this thesis; however, it is beneficial to provide 
an accepted list of common operations.  Peace operations include but are not 
limited to: 
• Humanitarian relief and assistance 
• Managing and supervising cease-fires 
• Observing and monitoring international agreements 
• Resettling displaced population 
• Assisting civil authorities 
• Assisting or maintaining public order 
• Establishing an interim government 
• Restoring essential services and building infrastructure 
• Helping governments to restore economy 
• Fighting against deadly diseases like AIDS 
• Organizing or supporting elections 
One of the most important things that set peace operations apart from 
conventional war is its participants. The participants in peace operations are 
generally noncombatants. Each operation has its unique set of mandates and 
objectives.  Furthermore, the operation environments are far different than those 
of conventional war. Therefore, tactics, techniques and procedures must be 
operation-specific.  
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The peace support operation examined in this thesis is the safeguarding 
of elections. The operation is investigated using an agent-based model called 
PAX, developed by EADS-Dornier for the German army. The election is held in 
an Iraqi town which is inhabited mostly by one ethnic group. There are some 
minorities in the town, too. Participants register polling at stations according to 
their residence. So, the inhabitants of the town vote in the polling station which 
 
6 Department of the Army, Stability Operations and Support Operations, Field Manual 3-07, 
(20 Feb 2003), p 4-2. 
4 
was built in the town. There are Peace Support Units (PSU) assigned to provide 
security and prevent escalations before, during and after the election. 
Furthermore, the polling station is accessible through a check point. Because of 
high security precautions, terrorist attacks within stations are unlikely but still 
possible. However, there are some disturbers whose intentions are to scare and 
threaten voters. The questions this research aims to answer are: 
1- Does the number of civilians in the theatre make any difference in the 
outcomes? People tend to behave differently in groups than when they are 
alone. Furthermore, it is likely that group size will affect the group 
dynamics. A person might become aggressive or calm down faster or 
more slowly in a big group, depending on the group’s tendency.  To 
observe the effects of group size on outcome of the simulation, this project 
tracks the escalation level among the groups, the number of threats and 
attacks from a particular group to PSU soldiers and other groups, the ratio 
of the number of votes to the number of voters in the theater, the number 
of aggressive and fearful people at the end of the simulation, and some 
other Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) provided by the PAX model. 
2- Does the ratio of disturbers to voters have any impact on the outcomes?  
It seems likely that having people from different ethnic groups (with 
different emotions, motivations and interest in the theater) will affect the 
larger group’s behavior.  The number of threats and attacks from one 
group to another group and to PSU soldiers is examined to measure the 
effects of different ratios. 
3- What is the impact of duty posts on the security of PSU soldiers and the 
outcomes of the election? Soldiers generally wait in secure posts for self 
protection, and become involved if something wrong happens. The 
number of threats and attacks is an appropriate MOE for this purpose.  
In addition to these questions, this thesis looks at long term effects. PSU 
soldiers do not leave the country the day after an election. Leaving behind angry 
and agitated people would cause serious problems. The number of angry people 
at the end of the simulation is a suitable MOE for indicating these long term 
5 
effects.  Depending on the outcome of the study, answers to these questions 
might suggest interventions that could be taken to increase voter participation in 
elections and improve the long term outlook. 
The Iraqi forces themselves provided the security for the January 30 
election with the help of the international forces in stand-off position. The PSU 
soldiers in the simulation are implemented as the forces that are in charge of the 
security of the election.   
 
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS                                           
The purpose of this thesis is to create an election scenario in a 
representative Iraqi town to point out the most important factors that impact the 
outcome of the election and the security of civilians and PSUs. Of particular 
interests are the effects of the factors under the control of the PSU, such as duty 
posts, the number of voters assigned to a particular voting area, and the rules of 
engagement (ROE) for the soldiers. This thesis also provides some feedback to 
the developers of the model PAX. Some useful suggestions are made to decision 
makers, as well. It is important to note that this thesis does not provide 
predictions about the future of Iraq or the results of the upcoming elections. 
This research focuses primarily on the impacts of instituting different sets 
of rules for PSUs in an election in an Iraqi town. A representative Iraqi town is 
built in the simulation that reflects the general environmental layout and 
population. The decision factors that warrant further exploration include: 
1. Size of the civilian group 
2. Proportion of disturbers in the vicinity  
3. Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
4. Presence/non-presence of duty posts for PSU soldiers 




• Readiness for aggression 
6 
• Group cohesion 
• Norms for anti-aggression 
• Elective motivation 
In order to compare after the outcomes from different scenarios, some MOEs 
are needed.  Some of the MOEs include: 
1. Number of civilians who voted 
2. Number of angry civilians at the end of the simulation 
3. Number of fearful civilians at the end of the simulation 
4. Level of escalation at the end of the simulation 
5. Proportion of population that turns violent, cooperative or neutral 
The scenarios are created and simulations are conducted in the agent-
based model PAX that was developed for peace support operations. The 
regression analyses and regression tree methods are adopted for data analysis 
purposes.   
 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I, where the scope of 
the thesis and specific research questions are addressed, provides background 
information and draws an outline of the thesis.  
Chapter II provides detail about the Iraqi population, particularly the Arab 
Sunnis, and the January 30 election results. The reasons for a lower Arab Sunni 
turnout than the other groups – the Shiites and Kurds – are of particular concern.  
In the 10th Project Albert International Workshop held in Stockholm, in May 
2005 (PAIW10) the developers of the PAX modeling platform introduced new 
futures, upgraded since the previous workshop. Chapter III provides a detailed 
description of the latest version of PAX, including how to create and conduct 
experiments using PAX. A detailed description of the scenarios is provided as 
well. 
Chapter IV presents the results and detailed analysis of the experiment 
and Chapter V is devoted to the conclusion and suggestions for future studies. 
7 
                                           
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN IRAQ 
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States and Coalition invasion of Iraq -- Operation Iraqi 
Freedom -- was launched on March 20, 2003. It can be summarized as the 
simultaneous execution of an intensive air campaign and ground offensive, fast 
movement of troops, blasts of the most high-tech and deadly weapons over Iraq's 
skies, and the most extensive coordination of different military services in the 
history of war.7 It took less than a month to topple a tyrant from power, and all the 
legends about an almighty army eager to fight to the last breath turned out to be 
nothing but a myth. Of course, the superiority of the US troops over the Iraqi 
military was undisputable, but one must acknowledge the success of the US 
troops.  
As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in a press conference 
on March 28, 2003, the US was capable of destroying a tank under a bridge 
without damaging the bridge.8  On the same day, an unexplained bomb hit a 
crowded marketplace in Baghdad, killing 15 and wounding 30 Iraqi civilians, most 
of whom were women and children. While Iraqis cursed the US for this incident, 
US spokesmen insisted that they were not targeting that area and it would have 
to have been a misfired Iraqi missile. Regardless of which side was responsible, 
this was one of the most tragic moments of the operation.  
By April 9, 2003 the military campaign achieved its primary goal: 
disempowering a dictator and his ruling organizations that had caused so many 
 
7 The operation resembled a showcase of newly developed high-tech weapons and weapon 
systems such as the RQ-1 Predator, a remotely operated unmanned aerial vehicle capable of 
operating for 24 hours without landing, and loaded with Hellfire missiles. The satellite guided 
smart ammunitions, which are lot more accurate than those infrared guided bombs that are 
heavily dependent on clear view, showed that the US learned its lessons from Gulf War I.    
Exploiting weather forecast data to shape the battlefield, especially during the sand storm that 
started on March 26, was another outstanding achievement from the military perspective. 
     8 Donald H. Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, press conference, March 28, 2003. 
Retrieved July 20, 2005 from http://www.iiss.org/iraqCrisis-more.php?itemID=88   
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people to suffer over the previous 24 years. No one knows how many Iraqis died 
during the operation, but it cost 139 lives from the Coalition Forces.9
The initial focus of the operation was to march rapidly towards Baghdad 
while securing the important oil fields.  It turned into a hunt for Saddam Hussein 
and his key aides.  Although the report was widely doubted, Saddam Hussein 
was reported captured in a foxhole on December 13, 2003.  
 
B. POST-SADDAM IRAQ 
The Pentagon's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
(ORHA), headed by retired US Army Lt. General Jay Garner, was initially 
established and charged with coordinating the relationships between the 
government agencies and non-governmental organizations that would participate 
in post-war Iraq. On April 13, 2003, Garner chaired a meeting in the town of 
Nasiriyah. Americans and Iraqi representatives from inside and outside the 
country discussed the future of Iraq.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
stated the purpose of this meeting in a press conference: "The purpose is to 
begin a dialogue with Iraqis on the future of their country, to build momentum for 
the formation of an Iraqi interim authority, and to help pave the way for a free 
Iraqi government that will eventually be chosen by the Iraqi people."10  Clearly, 
elections are a mechanism for Iraq’s transformation to independence, and its 
new status as a democratic nation. 
On April 21, 2003, ORHA was transformed into the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) as an occupation government. Authorized by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1483 (2003),11 the CPA equipped itself with executive, 
 
9 "Operation Iraqi Freedom Military Deaths." Washington Headquarter Services, Directorate 
for Information Operations and Reports, retrieved July 20, 2005 from 
http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/casualty/OIF-Deaths-Before.pdf. The reported number includes the 
deaths from the beginning of OIF to April 30, 2003.    
10 Kathleen T. Rhem and Jim Garamone, "Iraqis Discuss Future Government in 'Big Tent' 
Meeting."  American Forces Information Service News Articles. April 15, 2003,  Retrieved July 22, 
2005 from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2003/n04152003_200304157.html  
11 UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003). The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait. 
Retrieved July 24, 2005 from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html  
legislative, and judicial authority over the Iraqi government. The main CPA 
objectives were establishing security, providing essential services, building a 
market-based economy, and establishing a fully functioning government.12 The 
UN approval of coalition actions in post-war Iraq was crucial for bringing the 
necessary legitimacy to the process, because involving a highly respected 
international organization such as the UN is more appropriate than carrying out 
the process unilaterally.   
The most urgent and important problem the CPA had to deal with was 
establishing security. In 2004, it was clear that the security troubles in Iraq were 
not due only to looting and opportunistic attacks against former adversaries.  It 
was clear that there was an insurgency in Iraq attacking nascent Iraqi institutions, 
and that insurgency grew in 2004. Approximately 25 attacks per day were 
reported at the beginning of 2004, which increased to 60 by the end of the year. 
Figure 2 shows the number of daily attacks executed by insurgents by month.13  
 
Figure 2.   Number of Daily Attacks by Insurgents  
 
                                            
12 “An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments.” Coalition Provisional Authority Press 
Releases, June 28, 2004. Retrieved July 23, 2005 from http://www.iraqcoalition.org/pressreleases   
13 The chart is taken from “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in 




The gradual removal of US troops from Iraqi cities, and the lack of troop 
support from all countries but Great Britain, drove the Americans to press for 
“Iraqization”--the process of building Iraqi security forces.  
Although security was the first and foremost concern, the CPA decided to 
disband the former Iraqi army and build a new one from scratch. About 400,000 
trained soldiers were fired and not accepted into the new army. This caused 
serious complications for security. First of all, hiring them might have shortened 
the process of building the new army and enabled them to establish security 
faster. Secondly, most of the former army members provided valuable resources, 
like manpower and knowledge, to insurgent groups like Former Regime Loyalists 
(FRL). De-Baathisation included not only soldiers but also the former 
administrators, officials, teachers and other government employees. These 
people were Baath Party members. However, they joined the Baath Party not   
because they supported the Baath Party regime, but simply to attain or retain 
their jobs. Employing them and benefiting from their service and experience 
would have helped the reconstruction process flourish. Furthermore, the 
disbanded army consisted of mostly Sunnis, and firing the government 
employees who were also mostly Sunnis further alienated the Sunni population. 
The CPA started the process of recruiting, training and equipping the Iraqi 
Armed Forces (IAF). The IAF was to consist of the Iraqi Army (two divisions of 
motorized infantry), Iraqi National Guard, Iraqi Intervention Force, Iraqi Special 
Operations Forces – Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force, Iraqi Coastal Defense Force, 
and Iraqi Air Force.  
The CPA also sought to transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi transitional 
administration. On July 22, 2003, the CPA founded the Iraqi Interim Governing 
Council (IGC) and appointed its members. The Council members were generally 
Iraqi expatriates who had been in exile or escaped from the country during the 
rule of Saddam Hussein. There were also many opposition leaders who had 
been silent during the Saddam Hussein regime. The Council consisted of 
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different ethnic and religious groups including 13 Shiites, five Sunni Arabs, five 
Kurds, one Turkmen and one Assyrian Christian14. 
The IGC had its own responsibilities. On November 15, 2003, the CPA 
and IGC reached an accord on the process of political transition.15  On March 8, 
2004, the IGC signed an interim constitution known as “Transitional 
Administrative Law" (TAL) that would serve as the interim constitution effective 
from June 28, 2004, when the CPA would transfer sovereignty to the Iraqi 
people, until a permanent constitution could be approved by an elected 
parliament.   
The TAL guaranteed the fundamental rights of Iraqi citizens. Not 
surprisingly, it clearly defines who Iraqi citizens are. Anyone who carries Iraqi 
nationality is deemed as being an Iraqi citizen. Any Iraqi whose citizenship was 
withdrawn for political, religious, racial, or sectarian reasons during Saddam's 
reign was granted the right to reclaim his citizenship. Freedom of religion, 
freedom of speech, freedom of press and the right of privacy are among the 
rights TAL guarantees. It also set an election date for the National Assembly: 
January 30, 2005.  
 
C. JANUARY 30 ELECTIONS: A STEP FORWARD TO DEMOCRACY 
The Iraqi election at the end of January, 2005 was perhaps one of the 
most controversial elections in recent history. Some view the election as a step 
forward on the way to democracy for Iraqi citizens, while others view it as the 
 
14 Iraqi Governing Council, retrieved July 25, 2005 from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/igc.htm  
15 Iraqi Governing Council, retrieved July 25, 2005 from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/igc.htm. According to this accord, the IGC would 
draft a transitional law by February 28, 2004 which would be a temporary constitution that would 
serve as a Supreme Law during the transition period until a permanent constitution could be 
written and approved by a general election. By May 31, 2004, the IGC would establish a 
transitional national assembly that would then elect an executive branch and appoint ministers by 
June 30, 2004. The agreement also set a specific timetable for holding elections to elect the 
delegates to a constitutional conference. Elections for a new government under that constitution 
would be held by December 31, 2005.  
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biggest political mistake ever made. Some of the discussions revolved around 
the following questions:  
• Was Iraq ready for an election? 
• Was Iraq secure enough to hold an election? 
• Did all Iraqi candidates follow the proper campaign finance guidelines? 
• Had foreign money been used to influence the elections? 
• Did all the candidates jump through all necessary hoops to gain ballot 
access? 
• Were illegal immigrants prevented from voting? 
• Were all voters safe enough to vote? 
• Were standards at a level seen in democratic countries (like Canada or 
Australia)?  
A survey by the International Republican Institute prior to the election 
showed that 41.4% of Iraqis thought that they would vote for electing the 
president, while only 28.7% understood correctly they would vote for a 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA). The same survey indicated that 71.4% 
strongly intended to vote. It also showed that reluctance among the Sunni 
population was more common than for the other groups. One of the most 
important indicators that the survey revealed was that a large portion of people 
(40.4%) would boycott the elections if a respected organization called for 
boycott.16
Any Iraqi citizen who was 18 by December 31, 2004 and registered to vote 
could participate. Initial voter registration was prepared according to the Iraqi 
Public Distribution System. That list initially contained nearly 14 million Iraqi 
citizens. Citizens could be added and removed, or the information edited, up until 
December 15, 2004.17  
 
16 Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, International Republican Institute, November 24 – 
December 5, 2004. 
17 "Iraq Elections: Road to Democracy," U.S Department of State Bureau of International 
Information Programs. Retrieved July 20, 2005 from 
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/iraqelect/iraqelect.pdf
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The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) was the official body   
responsible for organizing the elections, certifying the political entities (parties, 
associations, groups and individual candidates) and ruling as an arbiter of 
electoral disputes. The IECI hired about 6,000 Iraqis to be employed in voter and 
candidate registration. The commission established more than 5,000 polling 
centers and hired and trained more than 100,000 locals to work in them on 
Election Day. 
Despite the controversy, the Iraqi people went to the polling stations to 
cast their votes on January 30, 2005.  They elected a 275-member Transitional 
National Assembly, members of the 18 provincial councils and members of the 
Kurdish regional government. Approximately 300 terrorist attacks, all of which 
were outside the election areas, were reported on the Election Day.18 It was a 
clever decision to close all roads to motor vehicles two days prior to the election 
to hinder terrorist attacks.  
On February 17, 2005, the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq 
announced the official results of the January 30 election.  They declared that 
94,035 out of 8,456,266 votes were invalid. Despite threats of violence and 
terrorist attacks, the turnout was slightly above 58%. The TNA consisted of 12 
parties out of 111 political entities on the ballot. The United Iraqi Alliance, which 
is the Shia alliance backed by Shia Muslim clergy, gained 140 seats with  47.6% 
of the total votes. The Kurdistan Alliance List, which brought the two main 
Kurdish parties together, gained 75 seats in the assembly with 24.5% of the 
votes. The Iraqi List, led by then Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, received 40 seats. 
With these results, no single political party held the two-thirds majority in the 
assembly necessary to establish the three-member Presidency Council. 
Selecting the three-member Presidency Council was a breakpoint in post-war 
Iraq. Although it is hard to say that the election was completely democratic, this 
three-member council was the first elected body to rule over the Iraqi people after 
Saddam’s removal from power.  
 
18 Iraqi Insurgency Groups, retrieved July 26, 2005 from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_insurgency.htm  
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The primary task of the TNA is to draft a permanent constitution. The TAL 
called for the Assembly to propose the draft by August 15, 2005.  The Iraqi 
people will go to a referendum to approve or disapprove the constitution on 
October 15, 2005. Additionally, the Iraqi people will elect the constitutional 
government in an election on December 15, 2005.  
 
D. A LEGACY ISSUE: SUNNI PARTICIPATION 
The results of the January 30 election showed that the Arab Shiite and 
Kurdish Iraqis are willing to vote. Did they see this as the quickest way to compel 
foreign troops out, or did they really want to use their new democratic rights? 
Another question pertains to the very low turnout of Arab Sunni voters. Why did 
they not also use this opportunity to gain representation in the constitutional 
assembly?  
Iraqi Sunnis make up approximately 20% of the Iraqi population. Although 
Iraqi Kurds, which make up approximately 15% of the Iraqi population, are Sunni, 
they are not included in the Sunni category because they are more highly 
motivated by their ethnic interests than by religious ties. Therefore, the category 
"Iraqi Sunnis" implies "Iraqi Arab Sunnis."  
Iraqi Sunnis are generally concentrated in Mesopotamia, which is 
bounded by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Specifically, they inhabit the so-
called "Sunni triangle" circumscribed by Tikrit in the north, Al-Ramadi in the west 
and Baghdad in the east. Baghdad and Mosul are the most populated Sunni 
cities. Figure 3 shows the ethnic makeup of Iraq.  
Why Sunni participation was low requires deeper analysis; however, it is 




Figure 3.   Ethnic Make-up of Iraq19 
First, although they made up no more than 20% of the population, the 
Sunnis were the ruling population over Iraq not only during Saddam’s reign but 
also during the British occupation and Ottoman rule. They enjoyed most of the 
privileges, like having jobs in state-owned businesses, high ranks in the army, 
and investments in the cities they inhabit, and so on. Not surprisingly, Coalition 
forces faced the most severe resistance during and after OIF in Sunni-populated 
areas. Approximately 80% of insurgencies occurred in Sunni-dominated central 
Iraq. The majority of those captured or killed were Iraqi Sunnis. Of the detainees, 
between 90 and 95% were Sunnis as well.20
                                            
19 The map is taken after Guardian Unlimited Network , "Provisional Results," retrieved July 
30, 2005  from http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-
files/Guardian/documents/2005/02/14/Iraq_election_results.pdf. The Sunni triangle is 
superimposed.   
20 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Developing Iraqi Insurgency: Status at End-2004” (Working 





                                           
Second, with approximately 60% of the majority, the Shiites were 
expected to dominate in an election. For Sunnis, who had ruled over Iraq for 
centuries, it would be devastating to lose the privilege of being the ruling class. 
Some might say that because it was a proportional representation formula, not 
“winner takes all,” they would not lose the privilege of ruling if everyone voted 
along sectarian lines. However, even assuming that all the Sunni population had 
voted and received proportional representation, this would mean sharing those 
privileges they had enjoyed for centuries. Furthermore, it would be too optimistic 
to expect Shiite and Kurdish representatives to treat the Sunnis democratically 
after long years of suffering. Therefore, boycotting the election might have 
seemed to them the only way out of this uncomfortable situation.  
Third, there was a harsh intimidation campaign to persuade or scare 
Sunnis not to vote. As Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Osama bin Laden's man in Iraq) 
stated, they started a fierce war against this election.  "We have declared a fierce 
war on this evil principle of democracy and those who follow this wrong 
ideology."21  As shown in Figure 3, the drastic increase in the number of the daily 
attacks by insurgents after March 2004, when the TAL was approved, is an 
indication of the intimidation campaign.  
Furthermore, the killings of civilians in a public market on March 28, 2003, 
and other incidents such as the disbanding of the former Iraqi Army and the firing 
of government employees, alienated the Sunni population from the US.  
On October 15, 2005, the Iraqi people will hold a referendum to approve 
the new constitution. After four months they will elect the assembly. Because 
they boycotted the election to the Transitional National Assembly, Arab Sunnis 
are disproportionately under-represented in that body. They were brought into 
negotiations on the Iraqi Constitution after the fact.22 The constitution itself was 
 
21 CBS News, “Car Bomb Targets Allawi Party HQ” retrieved July 17, 2005 from   
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/24/iraq/main668726.shtml
22 Hamza Hendawi, “Sunni Deal Reached on Drafting of Constitution”, Associated Press, 




                                           
approved August 28, 2005, following several delays.23 Unless Iraqi Sunnis 
participate in these upcoming elections, the future of democracy in Iraq will be 
jeopardized. For Sunnis to express themselves, representation in the assembly is 
the only way. Therefore Sunni participation is vital. Voting is not only a 
democratic right but also a responsibility for the Iraqi people on the way to 
democracy.  
The term "democratization" is generally used to express the process of 
transition from an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian system to a democratic 
political system where government policies are determined by officials chosen for 
a certain period of time by means of free, fair and periodic elections in which a 
significant portion of adults can vote without distinction as to race, sex, belief or 
social status. Freedom of speech and the free expression of viewpoints, common 
suffrage, participation in the political process without any restriction or coercion, 
and protection of minorities' rights are among the prerequisites of democratic 
systems.  
After Operation Iraqi Freedom, a democratization process for Iraq began. 
The aim is a system that will provide a free and contemporary environment for 
the Iraqi people, and a nation that will not be a threat to its neighbors and to 
global peace.  Although the shift from a tyranny to a democratic system is very 
important and promising, there are some risks and challenges that the Iraqi 
people might confront on the way to democracy.  
Historical records show that nations that begin institutionalizing democracy 
experience political and national violence during the transition process. In the 
early stages of democratization, as people start to enjoy some democratic rights 
such as voting and participating in the political process, ethnic conflicts become 
more likely. In most of the nations that take initial steps toward a democratic 
 
23  Associated Press Worldstream, “Iraqis Divided over Draft Constitution.” Retrieved       
August 28, 2005 from http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/universe/document?_m=b05f0acb14cb13af044343f90eecb86a&
_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkVA&_md5=e65b89d881ee0d53d0941a3e0909a10b   
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system, such conflicts generally burst out shortly after initial civil improvements 
like holding elections. 24  
There are some countries, like Algeria and Nepal, which had not 
experienced any societal or ethnic war prior to their democratization process. 
Their initial democratization efforts triggered destructive armed conflicts. More 
interestingly, most of the countries that experienced serious ethnic and societal 
conflicts failed to establish rational regimes. Consequently, they remained either 
autocratic or semi-democratic.25    
In multiethnic democratizing countries, nationalism starts to arise in the 
early stages of the transition. Political leaders find it easier to favor religious ties 
or ethnicity to gain popularity among their ethnic group rather than arguing about 
more complex urgent problems. Ironically, liberalization is often accompanied by 
a rise in sectoral conflicts.  
Although democracy is not well-defined and different approaches point to 
different aspects of it, common suffrage and opportunity for representation of all 
groups are among the requirements that most academicians agree on. Anyone, 
regardless of religion, ethnicity, race, sex or status should be able to participate 
in the political process and all groups should have adequate representation. 
Even though the TAL guaranteed that anyone who carried Iraqi citizenship could 
vote, the lack of Sunni participation affected the legitimacy of the January 30 
elections. Furthermore, during the preparation of the permanent constitution, 
Sunnis’ views were generally ignored by the Shiite and Kurdish representatives 
in the assembly. There is potential for a long period of armed conflicts among 
these three groups. 
 
24 Jack Snyder, “From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict” 2000. 
25 "Peace and Conflict 2005," Center for International Development & Conflict Management. 
Retrieved September 10, 2005 from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/peace_and_conflict.asp  
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III. MODELING TOOLS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
The main actors in peace support operations are noncombatant civilians, 
rather than soldiers. They follow what their internal states (emotion, fear, anger, 
etc.) dictate rather than the orders of a superior. Their behavior is determined 
after the inputs—either from outside or inside - are evaluated by internal 
processes. Group dynamics, the presence of a leader they might listen to and his 
attitude, interactions between civilians and soldiers, and the presence of rival 
groups in the theatre are some of the most important external inputs that might 
influence an individual’s behavior. Although they might be manipulated from 
outside, the internal processes of each individual are unique. Due to this 
uniqueness, individuals may respond differently to the same external influences, 
so individual behaviors are difficult or impossible to predict.  
The agent-based approach is suitable for modeling the human behavior 
patterns because with agent based approach situations are more likely to be 
represented close to reality. In agent-based models, real entities are modeled as 
entities in the simulation as well. 26 Agents pursue their goals by sensing the 
environment and evaluating their interactions with other agents. Interactions may 
affect an agent’s internal state as they do in real life. 
The PAX modeling platform that we utilize in this study was developed by 
EADS Dornier for the German armed forces. The main difference between PAX 
and other agent-based models is that PAX focuses on modeling civilian 
behaviors27. It also allows us to examine MOEs like escalation, fear, and anger: 
these are more appropriate for gaining insight into PSOs than attrition-based 
MOEs commonly reported in agent-based combat models. 
 
26 Gunther Schwarz, “Command and Control in Peace Support Operations Model PAX - 
Approaching new Challenges in the Modeling of C2.” 2004. 
27 Gunther Schwarz & Hans-Joachim Mosler, “Investigating Escalation Processes in Peace 
Support Operations: An Agent-based Model about Collective Aggression”, 2005. 
 
B. BUILDING THE MODEL 
The election is held in an Iraqi town which is inhabited primarily by one 
ethnic group. In our model there are two civilian groups in the area. The main 
group consists of potential voters (i.e., those who have registered to vote), but we 
will simply call them voters.  Voters are the agents colored purple at the 
beginning of the simulation in Figure 4. They may or may not cast their votes, but 
the admission control soldiers will allow them to enter the election area.  
Agents in the other group, which we call disturbers, have not registered 
to vote and are kept from entering the election area by admission control. They 
are colored red at the beginning of the simulation (see Figure 4). Their main 
intentions are to cause havoc, threaten, and frighten the voters to keep them 
from casting their votes. They represent civilians from minority ethnic groups, as 
well as civilians from the majority ethnicity that oppose the elections. Their anger 
is high at the beginning of the simulation. 




Figure 4.   Basecase Election Scenario (Small Group) 
20 
21 
There are 20 civilians in the “small group” basecase scenario—15 voters 
and 5 disturbers. In the “large group” basecase scenario there are 40 civilians, 
30 of which are voters. The ratio of disturbers to voters is 1/3 in both instances.  
There are three units of reserve soldiers outside of the election area. 
Because most of the civilians are coming from the east, two of the units are 
located on the east side of the election area.  The other unit is located on the 
southeast side of the election area. At the beginning of the simulation, all the 
reserve soldiers are waiting at their posts.  
The election area is located at the northeast side of the village. There are 
two gates.  The gate on the west wing of the election area is the entrance; the 
one on the south wing of the election area is the exit. These are defined as 
unidirectional gates. Agents can neither use the “entrance” to exit the polling 
station, nor enter the election area through the “exit.” Each gate is guarded by 
admission control soldiers. Their mission is to guard the gates and manage the 
entrance and exits. The admission control on the entrance allows civilians 
belonging to the voters group to enter the election area.  
The polling station is located on the north of the election area and guarded 
by two reserve soldiers. Their mission is to reduce any escalation in the election 
area, and guard the polling station. 
The rest of this chapter provides step-by-step explanations of the 
modeling tools, including the PAX User Interface, the PAX Scenario Editor, and 
the PAX Experiment Editor. 
 
C. PAX USER INTERFACE 
PAX is an agent-based modeling platform which focuses on peace 
support operations.  It concentrates on modeling civilian behaviors and group 
dynamics, providing the opportunity for analysts to investigate the effect on 
civilian behaviors of different actions committed by soldiers in accordance with 
different rule sets. 
After the PAX.bat file is invoked, either from the command prompt or by 
clicking directly on the batch file, the window in Figure 5 pops up. It provides all 
necessary means for running and analyzing a simulation with PAX. The user can 
create or modify a scenario, start and run a simulation or display and analyze the 
simulation. It has three drop-down menu options: File, Options and ?.   
 
Figure 5.   PAX-Start up 
 
1. File Menu 
When users click on the File menu, they can choose one of four options 
from the list displayed in Figure 6.   
 





a. Scenario Editor: 
 If this option is chosen, the editor called PAX Scenario Editor 
starts.  Using this editor, users can create new scenarios or modify existing ones. 
Further information about the editor will be provided in Section D of this chapter.   
b. Start Simulation:  
In order to start a simulation, a scenario must be created 
beforehand. After clicking here, users are asked to choose an existing scenario 
file. After choosing the scenario, users are asked to specify a starting value for 
the random variables in the model and to start the simulation. It may take a few 
minutes for the simulation to run. After the simulation has finished, the animation 
window appears.  
c. Show Animation:  
The animation window shows the animation of the just-completed 
simulation. Only the most recently-executed simulation is stored. Each simulation   
overwrites the previous simulation. Further information about the animation 
window will be provided in Section E.   
d. Exit:  
This option exits the programs. 
2. Options Menu 
Figure 7 shows the drop-down list for the Options menu. The option is 
limited to setting the language. Users can choose either English or German for 
the menu language.  
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Figure 7.   Option Menu Items 
3. ? Menu 
Figure 8 shows the ? menu options. The Help option provides an online 
manual for PAX.  The About option provides information about the contributors to 
the project and the developer’s contact information. 
 
Figure 8.   ? Menu Items 
 
D. PAX SCENARIO EDITOR 
The PAX Scenario Editor allows the user to create a PAX scenario. In the 
scenario, the user can define the properties of the terrain, which is the playing 
field where the agents interact.  The user also selects the types and initial 
locations of the agents, which can include civilians, soldiers and a service point 
(either a food distribution center or a polling station).   
Once the editor is invoked, the window depicted in Figure 9 appears. It 
has three drop-down menu options: File, Scenario and ?.   
 
Figure 9.   PAX Scenario Editor 
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1. File Menu 
When users click on the File menu, they can pick one of the five options 
from the list shown in Figure 10. Save and Save as options are initially inactive, 
since no scenario is yet created or loaded.  
 
    
Figure 10.   Scenario Editor File Menu Options 
 
a. New Scenario:  
Users create a scenario from scratch. If this option is chosen, a 
window opens that asks for the dimensions of the scenario. Figure 11 shows the 
Scenario Dimensions window. Each square is identified by a coordinate system 
(x,y). The coordinate of the bottom left square is (0,0). The x value increases 
towards the right side along the horizontal axis, and the y value increases 
upwards along the vertical axis. Methods for setting up the terrain and defining 
the agents and their will be explained in a later section. 
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b. Load Scenario:   
By choosing this option, users can open a previously created 
scenario to edit or simply to run. 
c. Save:   
This option saves a scenario created or edited by a user to disk, 
rewriting the existing scenario file.  
d. Save As:  
Users can save the scenario they created or edited to disk with a 
new name or format.  
e. Exit:  
Leave the editor  
2. Scenario Menu 
When users click on the Scenario menu, they can pick one of the two 
options from the list shown in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12.   Scenario Editor Scenario Menu Items 
 
a. Parameters: 
Apart from the model variables of each agent and cell, PAX defines 
a set of global parameters valid for either the whole scenario or for all civilian 
agents. It lets users edit global parameters (such as playfield dimensions or 
randomness settings), change the appearance of the playfield, and select which 
parameters are visible on the Selection pane. As Figure 13 shows, there are 
three tabs in the Parameters window.  
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 Figure 13.   Parameters Window 
 
(1) Scenario Pane: Users can set the size of the currently 
edited scenario in the Scenario Dimensions area. When resizing the playfield, 
the cells are added to or reduced from the top and right. Any agents located on 
cells that are cleared will also be cleared. To resize the playfield to its original 
dimensions, the editor adds only cells. In other words, any agents who were 
previously cleared are lost; the user must recreate them if they are needed.  
The Maximum Duration defines the maximum simulation 
duration if none of the natural criteria for stopping the simulation are fulfilled. The 
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simulation is stopped naturally if all the food packages are distributed in food 
distribution scenarios, and if all the civilians have voted in election scenarios. 
The Sigmata (Variances) section lets users specify a 
standard deviation for the starting conditions fear, anger, readiness for 
aggression, willingness for cooperation (in case of a leader) and pushing strength 
of each civilian. The users cannot specify the standard deviation for each civilian 
individually or each group separately, but just for all of them in common. Just 
before the simulation run begins, the model changes each civilian's value of fear, 
anger, readiness for aggression, willingness for cooperation (if the agent is a 
leader), and pushing strength according to random draws from a normal 
distribution with the specified standard deviation.  The results depend on the 
random seed provided to the model. This is to reduce the possibility that many or 
of the civilians will change their internal state simultaneously. (Otherwise, since 
they all start off with exactly the same parameterization, they might all change 
their internal state the same way due to very similar influences from their 
environment).   
The user can specify a mean deviation for randomness in 
model dynamics for the parameters fear, anger and readiness for aggression. 
These values influence the simulation runs so that whenever an action is 
selected by an agent, the relevant factors are manipulated according to uniform 
distributions with the mean deviations specified here.  For example, a mean 
deviation of 4.0 for anger implies that the anger value used to determine an 
agent’s action can differ from the agent's actual anger by at most 8.0. This 
means that before making certain decisions (such as whether to threaten or 
attack a soldier) the values of fear, anger and readiness for aggression can be 
slightly altered so that certain model thresholds are smoothed. For example, if a 
civilian's readiness for aggression is just below 30 he will not attack a soldier 
despite being angry. If, however, an agent is angry and his readiness for 
aggression is over 30, he is going to attack the soldier. The randomness effect is 
meant to avoid having a rigid threshold: civilians with slightly lower or higher 
values of readiness for aggression may sometimes violate expectations.   
The Action Ranges section defines the ranges in which 
agents can perform certain actions during a simulation.  
In the Miscellaneous Parameters section, agents' waiting 
times can be set so they are drawn randomly from a log-normal distribution. 
Otherwise, waiting times are always exactly one time unit. In some situations, 
some agents’ internal states may be so low that they can barely act, causing 
problems such as blocking an entrance or exit, or hindering other agents from 
accessing the food distribution center or polling station. In such cases, stronger 
agents may push through and change positions with weaker agents. Strength is 
defined by physical strength and motivational power.  Checking or unchecking 
the Pushing active box will activate or deactivate this feature.  If pushing is 
deactivated, then the strength for pushing cannot be altered. 
(2) Display Pane: Figure 14 shows the display pane. Here 
users can change the display size of the playfield. The actual size (in cells) of the 
playfield is not affected by this setting. Automatic handling adjusts the display 
size so that it fits best into the editor's draw panel. However, this default behavior 
can be changed and the size can be set manually.  
 
Figure 14.   Display Pane 
 
(3) Parameters Pane: In order to improve clarity in the 
selection panel to the editor's right, users can show or hide some of the agent's 
and cell's parameters. Such hidden parameters can no longer be set for any 
agent or cell, but they remain present and any values previously set for the 
existing agents and cells are preserved. Moreover, any new agents and cells are 
parameterized with the last values parameters had prior to being hidden. Figure 
15 shows the parameters pane. 
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 Figure 15.   Parameters Pane 
 
b. Custom Parameters:  
Some model parameters are, by default, not yet editable when a 
new scenario is created. The Custom parameters option lets users define these 
custom parameters.  The complete path to the model parameter (in the 
underlying code) must be specified. For example, if we want specific groups to 
be allowed to enter the election area, we need to type this in the parameter field 
as "Soldat[i]/S_Cognition/Akzeptierte_Gruppen[k]" where i stands for the soldier 
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ID and k for the group. The corresponding value should be “true,” as shown in 
Figure 16.   
 
Figure 16.   Custom Parameters Window 
 
3. ? Menu 
Figure 17 shows the ? menu options. Just as the corresponding menu in 
the PAX Startup window, the Help option provides an online manual for PAX 
Scenario Editor.  The About.. option provides information about the contributors 
to  the project and the developer’s contact information. 
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Figure 17.   ? Menu Options 
A scenario created by PAX Scenario Editor can be used for different 
purposes. First, it can be used as a direct input file for single runs of a PAX 
model. After running the single simulation, users can see the results and replay 
the simulation. Second, it can be used as an input file for running the model PAX 
using the so-called PAX Wrapper. Comma-separated output files are generated 
by the PAX Wrapper.  It is implemented as another layer wrapped around the 
model itself so that users can perform a single model run with an XML input file 
and CSV output. Finally, the scenario file created by the PAX Scenario Editor can 
be used as a base scenario for creating an experiment with the PAX Experiment 
Editor. Further information about the PAX Experiment Editor will be provided in 
Section F. 
The Scenario Editor can save files in two output formats: the PAX-specific 
XML format and the editor-specific XML format. Saved scenarios can be read in 
again from both of these formats, and both formats are suitable for performing 
studies with the Project Albert software OldMcData.  
4. Setting cells  
The Scenario Editor consists of two main parts. The playfield of the 
scenario being created is displayed on the left of the editor. The selection panel 
for choosing, modifying and deleting the agents and different types of fields is on 
the right side. The playfield on the left is initially filled with normal cells by default. 
To change the appearance of the environment, or to place agents onto the cells 
of the playfield, users must select the appropriate cell or agent type in the 
selection panel to the right of the editor. 
Setting a number of cells to a specific cell type can be done either by 
setting the cells one at a time or by drawing a rectangle with the left mouse 
button pressed. Users need to first select the type of cell they want to set from 
the selection panel. There are three forms of cell types possible, as Figure 18 
shows. 
 
Figure 18.   Cell Types 
 
a. Normal: 
Normal cells are the cells that all kind of agents can traverse.  
Every cell belongs to a certain area type, where area types 0, 1, 2, and 3 are 
represented by light-grey, light-blue, pink, and light-green colors, respectively. All 
cells initially belong to area 0 when a new scenario is created. For normal cells 
we can define portals between different area borders. Portals are gateways that 
enable passages back and forth between area borders. Unless a portal is 
defined, agents cannot traverse from one area to another. Portals between cells 
in the same area are meaningless. Figure 19 shows the portals pane. The space 
at the center represents the cell from which the portal will be defined. In order to 
define a portal, users simply click to check the box (or boxes) that represent 
surrounding cells.  More than one portal can be defined for a particular cell. 
Furthermore, a portal can be either unidirectional or bidirectional. The model is 
capable of reporting the measures of effectiveness for different areas, such as 
total escalation in the election area. 
 
 




Built-up cells represent shelters or refuge for civilian agents who 
are frightened, have already received supply packages, or have cast their votes. 
Built-up cells, like normal cells, belong to a certain area type. It is important to 
remember that agents cannot traverse the border between a normal cell and a 
built-up cell of a different area. In other words, in order to have built-up cells work 
as intended, the area type of the built-up cells must be the same as the normal 
fields surrounding the built-up cells. If an existing cell is occupied by a soldier or 
service point, setting a built-up cell there causes the agent or service point to be 
removed. 
c. Barrier: 
Barrier cells represent obstacles that no agents can traverse.  
These can model either natural barriers like rivers, or artificial barriers like walls 
and barbed wire.  
 
5. Setting Agents  
The playfield is a backdrop for the agents in the simulation. There are 
three types of agents that users can define. Figure 20 shows these types and 
their symbols.  A civilian’s color can change during the simulation, but soldier and 
service point agents always appear blue. 
 
 
Figure 20.   Types of Agents 
 
Agents can be set simply by clicking or drawing a rectangular region on 
the playfield. Whether an agent can be set on a specific position depends on the 
type of cell at that position. If a cell is designated as a barrier, no agent can be 
put on that cell. Only civilian agents can be placed on built-up cells. There are no 
limitations to setting agents on normal areas. To set an agent’s initial position to 
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a particular cell, users select the type of the agent they wish to set from the 
selection panel. Once an agent is selected, the parameters currently editable for 
this type of agent are shown in the lower part of the selection panel. 
a. Civilian: 
As described above, civilian agents can be set on normal or built-up 
types of cells.  Civilians' parameters in the current version of PAX include fear, 
anger, need, readiness for aggression, group cohesion, norms for anti-
aggression, status (leader or normal), willingness for cooperation, group, elective 
motivation, personality constants for initial fear, personality constants for initial 
anger, decrease of anger on success and pushing strength. However, the 
personality constants for fear, anger, decrease of anger on success, and pushing 
strength are hidden by default. The Parameters Pane section earlier in this 
Chapter explains how to make them visible.  Figure 21 shows the editable 
parameters of the civilian agents. 
 
Figure 21.   Editable Parameters of Civilians 
 
The parameters of a civilian agent can be chosen from the range 0 
to 100.  A civilian agent’s type can be set either as normal or as a leader. The 
parameter willingness for cooperation does not have any meaning for a normal 
civilian. It is a parameter for a leader, indicating how much he is willing to obey or 
get along with the soldiers. The parameter need corresponds to a need for food, 
and is not used in election scenarios.  Civilians can be set as belonging to a 
particular group (or ethnicity) that enables reporting measures of effectiveness by 
groups.  
Civilian agents are represented with colored dots in the simulation. 
Different colors represent different internal states. These colors change during 
the course of the simulation as the agents’ internal states change. An agent’s 
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dominant internal state at a specific point in time becomes the leading motive. 
The color codes used in the simulation are as follows: 
• Green    Fearful 
• Yellow    Needy (Hungry) 
• Orange  Angry 
• Red        Ready for Aggression 
• Brown    Obedient 
• Purple    Willing to vote 
• White      Neutral 
b. Soldier: 
Soldier agents can only be associated with normal cells. A soldier 
agent’s type can be set either to admission control or reserves. Admission control 
soldiers guard and manage entrances and exits. They do not move. If a soldier is 
set to admission control, the cell controlled by that admission control agent 
should be set as well. Reserve soldiers are capable of limited movement. The 
only movement currently implemented is that reserve soldiers will move towards 
the civilians if the escalation becomes high. The only common parameter for both 
types of soldier agents is the rule set.  Ten rule sets can be set in the editor.  
Only the first six rule sets have been implemented so far. Figure 22 shows the 




Figure 22.   Soldiers’ status and rule sets 
 
 
c. Service Points: 
Service points can only be associated with normal cells.  The types 
of service points available are supply vehicles or polling stations. The number of 
packages refers to the number of food packages that can be distributed in food 
distribution scenarios. In election scenarios it is not meaningful. Users can also 
set the amount of time that the service point needs to distribute one package or 




Figure 23.   Service Point Parameters 
 
d. Delete Agents: 
To delete agents, click on the tab shown in Figure 24 and then 
simply click on the agent to be deleted. Users can delete agents one by one as 
well as more than one at a time by dragging the mouse over the agents they 
want to delete. 
 
 
Figure 24.   Delete Agent 
 
One agent can replace another.  Simply specify the type of agent 




E. PAX ANIMATION WINDOW 
The PAX animation window enables users to review the course of a 
previous simulation. It serves as PAX’s playback tool.  It presents different model 
elements recorded during the simulation run. Users can have information about 




Figure 25.   Animation Window 
 
 
1. File Menu 
The only option is to exit the animation window.  
2. Options Menu 
a. Reset: 
It resets the animation to the starting time.  
b. Configuration Settings: 
Choosing “Configuration Settings” in the animation window's 
"Options" menu brings up a configuration dialog.  Figure 26 shows the 
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configuration dialog. Users can adjust the configurations under three sections: 
animation speed, field information, and other options.  
 
Figure 26.   Configuration settings 
 
(1) Animation Speed: To have the animation displayed so 
that every time unit takes the same amount of time regardless of how many 
events have occurred at that point in time, users should check Realtime mode 
for animation.  They can define a Delay to pause the animation after each time 
step, making the animation more traceable on fast machines.  
(2) Field Information: The information about agents’ 
deindividuation28 and readiness for aggression are hidden by default. Users can 
                                            
28 Prentice-Dunn, S. & Rogers, R. W, "Deindividuation and the Self-Regulation of Behavior". In P. 





make them visible (as part of the agent information dialog box) by selecting 
Show extended agent information. In order to see the information about an 
agent, simply click on that agent on the play field. Figure 27 shows an 
information dialog for a civilian agent. The show results button on the right 
bottom of the information dialog is initially invisible. Once one of the record X 
check boxes is activated, it becomes visible. Information about soldiers and field 
can be similarly displayed. Dynamic Update defines whether the information 
in the currently open information dialog is dynamically updated. If it is not 
checked, the information is not updated dynamically.  The Show interactions 
check box enables the user to switch between displaying and hiding the 
interactions between agents. It is a good practice to see the interactions among 
the agents; it gives better insight into the overall situation. In the underlying 
model agents jump from cell to cell, and the computations to determine their 
actions are time consuming. The default animation mode is an idealization of the 
model behavior that makes it easier for the analyst to track a specific agent and 
its behavior, in that agents' movements are interpolated as continuous. This can 
be deactivated by deselecting Movement of agents without interpolation so 
that the agents jump from cell to cell like they do in the model.  
 
Figure 27.   Information about agent on grid (14/20)  
 
(3) Other Options: Users can save a snapshot of the 
situation currently displayed in the animation window with Save terrain as JPEG 
file. The grid underlying the animation can be displayed or hidden by choosing 
the appropriate Show grid setting. Deactivate the graphs to the right side of the 
animation window by deselecting Show course of motivation.  Figure 28 shows 
the graphs that can be hidden. 
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Figure 28.   Course of motivation 
 
c. Show Results: 
This presents a summary of the current run.  
3.  ? Menu 
As before, the Help option provides an online manual for PAX Animation 
Window.  The About.. option provides information about the contributors to the 
project and the developer’s contact information. 
4. Button Panel 
A PAX Animation window has buttons that can be used to start, pause and 




Figure 29.   Button Panel 
Clicking on the pause button will pause the animation. The play button 
starts or continues the animation. By clicking the step button, a single animation 
step (0.1s) is performed. In the time panel the animation can be set to a certain 
point in time either directly or by using the slider. 
5. Result Presentation and Statistical Graphics 
On the right side of the playfield, the PAX Animation window provides 
some useful graphics about the course of simulation over time. This allows users 
to get a sense of the situation before starting further analysis.  Figure 30 shows 
the graphics displayed on the right side of the playfield.  
 
 
Figure 30.   Statistical Graphics 
 
In addition to the statistical graphics on the right side of the playfield, a 
general summary of the simulation run is available from the menu item Show 
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results under the Options menu. This option is not active until the animation has 
run from the beginning to the end of the simulation at least once. The summary is 
shown in a separate window. An example of a summary window is displayed in 
Figure 31.  
 
Figure 31.   General Summary of the Simulation Run 
 
Detailed statistics about a particular agent are available as well. If an 
agent's parameters have been recorded, they can be displayed by selecting the 
Show results button in the agent's information dialog shown in Figure 27. The 
previously recorded course of the parameters is shown in a separate window; an 
example is displayed in Figure 32.   
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Figure 32.   Recorded Parameters of Civilian 18 
 
F. PAX EXPERIMENT EDITOR 
The PAX Experiment Editor provides a graphical user interface (GUI) that 
lets users create a PAX experiment with multiple excursions which can be run 
using the OldMcData software created by MITRE Corporation. It allows more 
than two parameters at a time to be varied. Once the experiment editor is 
invoked, a graphical interface similar to scenario editor opens.  
1. File Menu 
When users click on the File menu, they can pick one of the six options 
from the list. Save and Save as options are initially inactive because no 
experiment has been created or loaded yet. Figure 33 shows the File menu 
options. 
 
Figure 33.   PAX Experiment Editor File Menu Options 
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a. New Experiment: 
The New Experiment option let users create a new experiment 
from scratch. Once they chose this option, a dialog window appears asking for 
the name of the scenario which will serve as the base case for the experiment. 
Therefore, the user must create a scenario before creating an experiment.  
However, if there are no preexisting scenarios, users can invoke the PAX 
Scenario Editor from PAX Experiment Editor by choosing the New scenario 
option from File menu. This opens the Scenario Editor previously described in 
Section E.  With the basecase scenario loaded, the window looks like similar to 
Figure 34. The left side is called the selection panel and the right side is called 
the parameterization panel. Unlike in the scenario editor, the playfield on the left 
cannot be edited. That means neither agents nor cells can be added or deleted, 
and the positions of the agents and cells on the playfield cannot be changed. The 
left part of the editor simply shows the playfield with all of its objects waiting for 
parameterization, and serves as the selection panel for performing this 
parameterization. 
 




b. Load Experiment: 
By choosing Load experiment from the File menu, users can open 
a previously saved experiment description file. After they have chosen an 
experiment description file, the editor reads the name of the associated basecase 
scenario file and tries to open it. If the experiment description file and the 
basecase scenario file are not located in the same directory, which is called the 
study directory, a message dialog similar to Figure 35 will warn that the basecase 
is not found.   
 
Figure 35.   Basecase File Not Found Warning 
 
Once the user hits the OK button in Figure 35, another dialog box 
will pop up to enable the user to locate the basecase file manually. If the selected 
basecase contains a scenario which is in some way incompatible with the 
experiment, the editor still tries to locate and group all agents and cells to be 
varied in that basecase scenario. Any warnings that occur during this process 
appear in another dialog window. Figure 36 shows examples of these warnings. 
 
Figure 36.   Warnings Occurred When Loading Basecase File  
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After the experiment loads successfully, the playfield shows on the 
editor's selection panel, while the groups and varied parameters are displayed on 
the parameterization panel on the right.  
c. Save: 
  When saving the experiment, the editor automatically saves the 
basecase scenario into the same directory as the experiment file. The basecase 
scenario defines the values of all variables in the model, while the experiment 
description file specifies a set of parameters that are being parameterized 
differing from that variable's default value. Thus the experiment description file 
drives a process in which OldMcData creates a scenario for each parameter 
variation by changing the default values of the basecase scenario appropriately 
and performing a simulation run based on that scenario. The name of the 
basecase file can be specified in the Experiment settings. The basecase 
scenario is always saved in XML format regardless of its file name. If a file with 
that name already exists it is overwritten without warning. It is generally 
recommended that an experiment be saved to a designated empty folder since 
OldMcData writes all input and output files of the experiment, as well as logging 
and error files, to that folder.  
d. Save As: 
Users can save the created or edited experiment to disk with a new 
name or format.  
e. Exit: 
This leaves the experiment editor. 
2. Experiment Menu 
The Experiment menu basically lets users change or adjust experiment 
settings. Figure 37 shows the Experiment menu options.  
 Figure 37.   PAX Experiment Editor Experiment Menu Options 
 
a. Parameters Dialog: 
The global settings can be set in the parameter dialog which opens 
when Parameters is selected in the Experiment menu. These parameters have 
impact on the execution of the experiment. The Parameter dialog box has three 
tabbed panes with settings, as Figure 38 shows. 
 
Figure 38.   PAX Experiment Editor Parameters Dialog 
 
(1) Experiment: The settings in the Experiment paths section 
determine which files and folders are accessed by OldMcData when executing 
the experiment. The Basecase scenario specifies the name of the basecase 
scenario file. This name can be freely chosen and the basecase scenario of the 
current experiment is automatically saved under this name in the study directory 
when saving the experiment.  The Excursion directory specifies the name of the 
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folder to store the excursions created by OldMcData. The Excursion filestub 
specifies the first part of the excursions name to be created. The MOE directory 
is the directory to store the output files to which the results of the simulations are 
saved. They are used by the PAX Post Processor to create the .csv file used for 
data analysis purposes.  The MOE filestub specifies the names of output files 
stored in the MOE directory. It is recommended that users leave those settings 
untouched or use the same naming convention if changes are desired.  
There are two types of executions. The pull-down menu 
Execution permits a choice between Local and Condor. Local let users conduct 
the experiment on their local machine while Condor enables the runs to be 
conducted on a Condor pool. By deactivating the Make simulation runs switch, 
users simply tell OldMcData to prepare the experiment and create all files and 
folders needed to execute the experiment, without actually running it.  
 
Figure 39.   Choose Random Seeds 
 
(2) Additional Info: This pane's settings are only for 
information purposes and do not affect the course of an experiment. It is possible 
to provide a short description of the experiment and information about the user.  




Figure 40.   Additional Info Pane 
 
(3) Model Info: If there is more than one version of the model 
PAX registered with OldMcData, users can define which version is being used in 
this pane. The version defined on this pane must match the settings in 
OldMcData. These are quite sensitive settings; therefore it is recommended that 
users not change the default value unless they have loaded a basecase scenario   
created by an old version of PAX. From a practical point of view, it is highly 
recommended that the basecase scenario be created with the same version. 
Figure 41 shows the Model Info pane. 
 
Figure 41.   Model Info Pane 
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3. ? Menu 
Once again, the Help option provides an online manual for PAX 
Experiment Editor.  The About… option provides information about the 
contributors to the project and the developer’s contact information. 
4. Grouping Agents 
Before agents can be parameterized, they must be grouped.  Agents must 
be selected on the selection panel before they can be grouped. Selecting an 
agent is done by simply clicking on it. In order to select all agents located in a 
particular region of the playfield, drag the mouse over that region and release the 
mouse when all the desired agents are selected. Selected agents icons are 
tinged with a dark blue overlay.  Figure 42 shows two rows of agents. The agents 
on the upper row are normal; those on the lower row are selected.  
 
 
Figure 42.   Selected Agents 
 
To add agents to an existing selection, simply click on the agent or agents   
while pressing the Ctrl key. Similarly, to remove an agent from a selection, click 
on that agent while keeping the Ctrl key pressed. After agents are selected they 
can be grouped via a popup menu by right-clicking on the selected agents. 
Figure 43 shows the pop up menu for grouping agents. 
 
 
Figure 43.   Grouping Agents 
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Once users select the menu item Group, the agents currently selected are 
placed into a new group that shows up on the parameterization panel. Users can 
give the newly created group a name that represents the group’s main 
characteristic.  As seen in Figure 44, the number of agents in the group is 
reported to the right of the group’s name. 
 
Figure 44.   Naming Groups 
 
To add an agent to an existing group, simply right-click on the agent and 
choose the Add to group option from the pop up menu shown in Figure 43. This 
option will show all the groups to which agents can be added, and the 
appropriate group can be selected.  The experiment editor allows users to add an 
agent who has parameters that differ from those of the selected group. For 
example, a soldier can be added to a group of civilians. However, in such cases 
the agents have different sets of parameters, so no parameters can be varied 
during an experiment. If an agent who already belongs to one group is added to 
a different group, it is automatically removed from its original group.  
Removing an agent from a group is done in similar fashion. After right 
clicking on the related agent, choose the Release from group “group_name” from 
the pop up menu that is seen in Figure 45. 
 
 
Figure 45.   Release from Group 
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To delete an entire group, right click on the group’s name on the 
parameterization panel. Then choose the Remove group “group_name” option 
from the pop up menu displayed in Figure 46.  
 
 
Figure 46.   Remove Group 
 
By choosing the Add group “group_name” to option, users can add all the 
agents in one group to a different group that has been already created. This will 
automatically remove the previous group as well. The other possibility is to create 
a new group by selecting New group option.   
5. Parameterizing Groups 
It is not too bold to say that the PAX Experiment Editor is all about 
parameterizing the groups. Parameterization is its main focus. A set of values 
can be defined for the parameters of the agents which are varied in the 
experiment.  As stated previously, to parameterize a group, all the agents in that 
group should support the same parameters. First, a parameter to be varied must 
be added to a group by right clicking on the group's name in the parameterization 
panel and selecting Add parameter to group <group_name> (Figure 46). Once 
this option is selected, all parameters that can be varied appear as shown in 




Figure 47.   Parameters to Vary 
 
Once the desired parameters are added, they appear in a new region of 
the window as in Figure 48 with a title, an input field, and a set of editable value 
fields under the group’s name in the parameterization panel.  
 
Figure 48.   Value Inputs for Parameters 
 
The parameter area initially contains 18 empty value fields. The number of 
fields increases automatically once the number of values for the parameter 
exceeds 18. The white cell on the right of the parameter’s name is for inputting 
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values. However, the values can also be typed directly into the value fields. 
Clicking on one of the value fields makes it editable. Typing a new value 
overwrites the old one. The order of the values is ascending.  
Values can be deleted by right-clicking the corresponding value field and 
then using the popup menu to delete them.  It is possible to delete more than one 
value field simultaneously by first pressing the Ctrl key while clicking on the 
corresponding value fields. Users can select a whole range of values by clicking 
the first value and then the last value in the range while depressing the Shift key. 
To remove a parameter from the experiment, select the menu item Remove 
parameter “parameter_name> from group <group_name>from the pop up menu.  
6. Reading Values from a File 
In large scale experiments, values for parameters are generally created by 
experimental designs like Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube Designs29. In such 
cases, the Experiment option should read the values from the files created by 
design tools. Unfortunately, the PAX Experiment Editor is currently unable to do 
this. However, users can accomplish this manually by editing the .xml file created 
by the PAX Experiment Editor.  
If the values are read from a file, users do not enter values for the 
parameters. After all the parameters to be varied are added to the groups’ 
parameters list, the user should save the experiment without adding any values. 
This will produce a warning similar to the one shown in Figure 49. Save the 
experiment while ignoring the warning message. This creates the .xml paths of 
the parameters correctly.  
 
 
29 Susan M. Sanchez, “Excel Spreadsheet for Generating Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube Designs”, retrieved September 16, 2005 from 
http://diana.cs.nps.navy.mil/seedlab/NOLHdesigns.xls. This spreadsheet is based on the study of  
Cioppa, T. M. and T. W. Lucas, “Efficient Nearly Orthogonal and Space-Filling Latin Hyper cubes”
 
Figure 49.   Attention Message 
 
Upon saving the experiment, the PAX Experiment Editor will create two 
.xml files as previously described. Users need to edit the study file (not the 
basecase file) by using a word editor.  Replace the lines 




<GeneratorAlgorithm type="File" name="File" 
classname="oldmcdata.generators.RunDataFromFileGenerator 




The filename “C:\SKGUN\NOLHdesigns_For_Elections.csv” is an example 
of the name of the file to read with its full path. After saving this revised .xml file, 






                                            
30 OldMcData is a data farming tool developed by Project Albert Group. Information about 
the Project Albert Group can be found on www.projectalbert.org  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COLLECTED DATA 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to linear regression and 
regression tree techniques used for analysis purposes. It then explicitly presents 
the questions to be addressed, the factors to be varied, and MOEs. Later in the 
chapter the analysis of the data collected from the experiments is provided.  
Regression models are developed to identify critical or significant factors that 
could be important in election scenarios. 
 
B. LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Regression analysis is a statistical analysis technique used to examine 
and model the relations between variables, which are generally called the 
response variable (Y) and one or more regressors or predictors (X’s). A predictor 
or regressor can be defined as a variable that is used to explain some 
characteristics of the response variable.  Regressors can also be functions of 
explanatory variables.  For example, X12 is a quadratic regressor and X1X2 is a 
two-way interaction.  A regression model which involves only one predictor is 
called Simple Linear Regression Analysis. Linear regression tries to explain the 
relationship with a straight line that fits the data set. The equation of that straight 
line is generally used to describe the data, estimate the parameters, or predict 
and estimate values for data points out of the data set. Not surprisingly, the term 
Multiple Linear Regression is used to describe regression models involving more 
than one predictor variable. 
One measure of the value of a multiple regression model is its statistical 
significance.  If the overall p-value from the regression is small (less than some 
pre-specified α, typically α = 0.05), this means it is unlikely that there truly is no 
relationship between the regressors and the response variable.  Once statistical 
significance is established, the coefficient of determination (R2) measures the 
proportion of variation in Y explained by the regressor variables in the model. R2 
is a number between 0 and 1. R2 values that are close to 1 indicate that most of 
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the variability in the response is explained by the regression model, whereas 
values close to 0 imply that the model fails to explain most of the variability in the 
response. Adding variables to the model will never decrease the R2 value. 
It is almost always impossible to explain all characteristics of the 
response. Adding all the variables and trying to fit the regression model might 
sound right at first; however, that could make the model overly complicated and 
expensive, and therefore unusable There are often tradeoffs involved when 
deciding whether to add variables (or quadratic or interaction terms) to the 
model. 
Evaluating all possible regression models and deciding on a fairly good 
model is generally a time-consuming task. In order to mitigate this problem, some 
useful techniques have been developed. One of the most commonly used is the 
stepwise regression method. Stepwise regression is an approach that selects a 
subset of factors for a regression model by adding and removing factors one at a 
time. The stepwise regression method generally adds or removes the model 
terms by adopting forward selection, backward elimination, or a mixture of these 
procedures. Forward selection starts without any terms in the model and adds 
the most significant term to the model at each step until there are no significant 
terms left. On the other hand, backward elimination starts with a model that 
includes all of the potential terms, and removes the least significant term from the 
model at each step until all of the terms remaining in the model are significant. 
The most significant term is the term with the highest partial F statistic or lowest 
p-value. This study adopts stepwise regression with mixed elimination where, at 
each step, the most significant term enters the model and then the least 
significant term leaves the model if its p-value is large. 
Sometimes the equation of a straight line is not enough to explain the 
relation between response and predictors. The behavior of the response might 
be represented by a curve.  Interactions among predictors and powers of 
predictors to the model can be added to explain the behavior of the response. 
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C. REGRESSION TREES 
Regression trees are nonparametric models that recursively partition the 
data in accordance with the relation between response and predictors. A 
regression tree consists of nodes and branches.  A node is a decision point 
where the data set is split. Regression trees are created by binary recursive 
partitioning. The data set is divided into two partitions and then further divided 
into partitions on each of the branches.  One of the advantages of regression 
trees is that predictors can be a mixture of categorical and continuous variables 
(ordinal and nominal). If the predictor is a continuous variable, the partition is 
created on a certain value. For example, one branch might correspond to X<=4 
and the other branch to X>4.  If the predictor is a categorical variable, the data 
set is divided into groups of levels.  For example, one branch might correspond 
to X = group A or C, and the other branch to X = groups B, D, and E. 
The number of partitions is a matter of interest.  The analyst must choose 
between accuracy and generalization. Too many partitions may mean the data 
set is over-fit, while a small tree may fail to capture the overall structure of the 
data. 
 
D. RUNNING THE EXPERIMENTS AND COLLECTING THE RESULTS 
Eight experiments are conducted. Each experiment has 65 design points 
with 30 replications at each design point. The categories of group size, presence 
of the duty posts and the ratio of the number of disturbers to the number of voters 
require different base-case scenario files to be set up. All combinations of these 
categories are investigated. The experiments are listed below: 
• EXPERIMENT_I - BasecaseLargeGroup:  The number of civilians 
is 40. The duty posts are present. The ratio of the number of 
disturbers to the number of voters is 1/3.  
• EXPERIMENT_II - BasecaseSmallGroup: The number of civilians 
is 20. The duty posts are present. The ratio of the number of 
disturbers to the number of voters is 1/3.  
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• EXPERIMENT_III - NoDutyPostLargeGroup:  The number of 
civilians is 40. The duty posts are not present. The ratio of the 
number of disturbers to the number of voters is 1/3.  
• EXPERIMENT_IV - NoDutyPostSmallGroup:  The number of 
civilians is 20. The duty posts are not present. The ratio of the 
number of disturbers to the number of voters is 1/3.  
• EXPERIMENT_V - EqualSizeLargeGroup:  The number of civilians 
is 40. The duty posts are present. The number of disturbers is 
equal to the number of voters.  
• EXPERIMENT_VI - EqualSizeSmallGroup:  The number of civilians 
is 20. The duty posts are present. The number of disturbers is 
equal to the number of voters.   
• EXPERIMENT_VII - NoDutyPostEqualSizeLargeGroup: The 
number of civilians is 40. The duty posts are not present. The 
number of disturbers is equal to the number of voters.  
• EXPERIMENT_VIII - NoDutyPostEqualSizeSmallGroup: The 
number of civilians is 20. The duty posts are not present. The 
number of disturbers is equal to the number of voters. 
1. Questions Under Investigation 
These experiments aim to answer the questions listed below: 
• What are the impacts of rule sets used by admission control 
soldiers and reserve soldiers located inside and outside of the 
election area on number of votes at the end of simulation? 
• What are the impacts of rule sets used by admission control 
soldiers and reserve soldiers located inside and outside of the 
election area on overall escalation at the end of simulation? 
• What are the impacts of the angry group on the number of votes at 
the end of the simulation? 
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• What are the impacts of the angry group on the overall escalation 
at the end of the simulation? 
• Does the presence of the duty posts outside the election area have 
an impact on overall escalation and the security of PSO units? 
• What are the impacts of different ratios of disturbers to civilians?  
In order to answer these questions, some of the MOEs provided by the 
agent-based modeling platform PAX are investigated. They include: 
o Aggregated escalation (Agg_esc)  
o Escalation at the end of the simulation (Esc_end) 
o Escalation outside the election area at the end of the 
simulation (Esc_out) 
o Escalation inside the election area at the end of the 
simulation (Esc_in) 
o Ratio of number of votes to number of voters (Ratio_Votes) 
o Number of attacks conducted by civilians against civilians 
(Attacks_civ_civ) 
o Average readiness for aggression among all civilians 
(Avg_RFA) 
2. Parameters to Vary 
In these experiments, the factors that are varied are listed below:  
• Initial fear level of voters (Voter/Fear) 
• Initial anger level of voters (Voter/Anger) 
• Elective motivation of voters (Voter/EM) 
• Readiness for aggression of voters (Voter/RFA) 
• Group cohesion of voters (Voter/GC) 
• Norms for anti-aggression of voters (Voter/NFAA) 
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• Initial fear level of disturbers (Dist/Fear) 
• Initial anger level of disturbers (Dist/Anger) 
• Readiness for aggression of disturbers (Dist/RFA) 
• Group cohesion of disturbers (Dist/GC) 
• Norms for anti-aggression of disturbers (Dist/NFAA)  
• Rule sets used by reserve soldiers outside the election area 
(RO/RS) 
• Rule sets used by admission control soldiers (AC/RS)   
• Rule sets used by reserves soldiers inside the election area (RI/RS)  
In these experiments, the NOLHDesigns spreadsheet31 is used. This is an 
efficient way to collect data to explore how the MOEs are affected by all factors 
simultaneously. For the basecase scenario, which is a 14-factor experiment, 65 
design points are generated. Figure 50 shows a sample of the spreadsheet.32   
Once the factors are selected, appropriate ranges for each of the factors 
must be chosen.  The environment created for the agent-based model reflects 
the environment faced by many Iraqi civilians.  Iraqi civilians experienced wars 
like the Iran-Iraqi War (1980-88) and the Gulf War I (1991). For the last two 
years, suicide attacks, car bombs, and insurgencies have become part of their 
daily lives. Therefore it is realistic to assume that the civilian norms for anti-
aggression are low. For the voters, levels of 40 and below were chosen, and for 
the disturbers, 30 and below.  
The disturbers represent a group of people aged between 18 and 30, 
generally male and full of anger against the Western presence and influence in 
 
31 Susan M. Sanchez, “Excel Spreadsheet for Generating Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube Designs”, retrieved September 16, 2005 from 
http://diana.cs.nps.navy.mil/seedlab/NOLHdesigns.xls. This spreadsheet is based on the study of  
Cioppa, T. M. and T. W. Lucas, “Efficient Nearly Orthogonal and Space-Filling Latin Hyper cubes” 
  
32 For more discussion of issues involving simulation experiments see Kleijnen, J.P.C., S.M. 
Sanchez, T.W. Lucas, T.M. Cioppa. 2005. A user's guide to the brave new world of designing 
simulation experiments. INFORMS Journal on Computing, 17(3): 263-289.
the region. Initial anger levels of 70 and above are appropriate for these 
purposes because this makes them really angry. Their initial fear is kept under a 
certain level in order to make anger their leading motive. In this case, it was set 
to 60 and below, so the highest initial fear is lower than the lowest initial anger 
level. 
 
Figure 50.   A Sample of NOLHDesigns Spreadsheet 
 
The voters faced an intimidation campaign before the January 30 election. 
They had been told that anyone who participated in the election would pay for 
their actions.  This author predicts that a similar intimidation campaign will be 
launched in coming elections. Therefore, the voters will have some fear. 
Furthermore, they will be confronting soldiers from a different country, which 
would make the voters more fearful. In order to make the model voters start with 
some amount of fear, 30 was chosen for the lowest fear level. 
All other factors related the civilian group range from 0 to 100 to see the 
impact of the different levels on the outcome.  
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The only parameter varied in the NOLHDesigns spreadsheet related to 
PSU soldiers is the rule set. There are six implemented rule sets in model PAX. 
The first rule set is based on the PSU Manual. Rule set 4 is known as the 
“Gandhi Strategy”. According to Rule set 4, soldiers always pacify civilians 
regardless of their actions. According to Rule set 6, known as “Zero Tolerance,” 
soldiers always defend no matter what the civilians do. Rule sets 2 and 3 dictate 
actions between the extremes. All of these are investigated.                    
 
E. ANALYZING THE RESULTS  
The experiments are run using OldMcData software. OldMcData is an 
application for small-scale data farming. It can handle multiple replications of a 
single excursion on a single machine. Each experiment is run separately. The 
experiments with large groups take more than one week to run.  After each run, 
the results are written into a comma separated file (.csv) with the help of 
OldMcData. The results are combined into a big output file for data analysis 
purposes.   
1. Investigation of Aggregated Escalation   
It is very important to carry out peace support operations in peace, as the 
name indicates. After a specific operation, whether it is a “food distribution” 
operation, “election” support, or some other stability operation, the PSU generally 
continues its mission. The aggregated escalation at the end of the simulation is 
an appropriate MOE for investigating the peacefulness of the process. 
The stepwise regression produces a model with 36 terms, 19 of which are 
main effects.  The R2 is 0.882, which means that nearly 90% of the variability is 
explained by the model. However, a model with 36 terms is so hard to explain it 
is unusable. At this point, the dilemma is choosing between a model that 
accounts for more of the variability or one that is simpler.  After removing some of 
the terms, a simpler model that contains ten terms, six of which are main effects, 
is settled on. The R2 of the new model is 0.779. Figure 51 shows the factors, 
along with their slope estimates, standard errors, t-ratios, and p-values.  
 
Figure 51.   Parameter Estimates for Aggregated Escalation      
 
The p-values for all 10 terms are low. This means that further removal of 
the terms would leave a significant term out of the model. The terms 
RO/RS{6&2&1&5&3-4} and DistRatio stand out as the most important effects. 
RO/RS stands for the rulesets adopted by reserve soldiers located outside the 
election area. DistRatio stands for the ratio of the number of disturbers to the 
number of voters. JMP automatically concatenated the {6&2&1&5&3-4} naming 
convention to RO/RS, showing that Ruleset 4 (which is the Gandhi Strategy) is 
different than the other rule sets. Under the Gandhi Strategy, the soldiers always 
try to pacify the civilians regardless of their actions. As seen in Figure 51, the 
coefficient of the term RO/RS{6&2&1&5&3-4} is -975.4.  This means that 
adopting any rule sets other than 4 for reserve soldiers located outside of the 
election area would decrease the escalation by as much as 975.  On the other 
hand, adopting the Gandhi Strategy for reserve soldiers located outside of the 
election area would increase the escalation as much as 975.  
Another controllable variable revealed by the model is DutyPosts[No]. This 
means that no duty posts are built in the theater. The absence of duty posts 
makes the aggregated escalation increase.    
JMP provides a feature called the Prediction Profiler. It shows the changes 
in the response predicted by the regression model as one variable changes while 
the others stay constant.  The Prediction Profiler is particularly effective when 
used interactively.  To convey the information, several snapshots of the 
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prediction profiler diagram are provided.  Figure 52 shows the prediction profiler 
diagram when the Gandhi strategy is not adopted, duty posts are not present, the 
DistRatio is 0.333, and the initial readiness for aggression of both voters and 
disturbers are at their middle levels.  As shown at the left of the diagram, a 95% 
confidence interval for the mean aggregated escalation is 438.5 +/- 80.3. The 
slopes, other than that of Rulesets, are relatively flat. This means that changing 
any single factor other than the Ruleset will not make a very big difference in 
aggregated escalation.  
 
Figure 52.   Aggregated Escalation When Rule Set = 6&2&1&5&3 and DistRatio = 
0.333  
Figure 53 shows that the aggregated escalation increases to 2764.2 if 
Gandhi Strategy is adopted and DistRatio is 0.333. Unlike Figure 52, the slopes 
in Figure 53 are steeper, particularly for Voter/RFA and Dist/RFA. This reveals 
the interactions between RFA terms and Ruleset 4. If Ruleset 4 is adopted, RFA 
terms become more important in the model.  
 
Figure 53.   Aggregated Escalation When Rule Set = 4 and DistRatio = 0.333  
 
The diagrams on the prediction profilers in Figure 54 and 55 show the 
levels of escalation when DistRatio is 0.5. If any ruleset other than the Gandhi 
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Strategy is adopted, the aggregated escalation decreases to 597.5. If the Gandhi 
Strategy is adopted, the escalation increases to 2920.3.  The ruleset adopted by 
the reserve soldiers located outside the election area has the biggest impact on 
escalation regardless of the DistRatio. However, smaller DistRatios always 
reduce the average escalation by some amount.  
 
Figure 54.   Aggregated Escalation When Rule Set = 6&2&1&5&3 and DistRatio = 0.5 
 
 
Figure 55.   Aggregated Escalation When Rule Set = 4 and DistRatio = 0.5 
 
The aggregated escalation model may be represented as  
Agg_esc = -476.7889 + 23.657022*x1 + 101.17766*x2 + 935.00108*x3 + 
6.4519587*x4+ 10.452086*x5 - 975.432*x6 -185.9881(x2*(x6 – 0.6)) + 
47.587565*((x3 – 0.415)*(x5 – 50.0308))  -7.404143* ((x4 – 50.0308)*( x6 – 0.6)) -
14.10791*((x5 – 50.0308)* ( x6 – 0.6))  
where: x1 = CivSize 
  x2 = DutyPosts[No] 
  x3 = DistRatio 
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  x4 = Voters/RFA 
  x5 = Dist/RFA 
  x6 = RO/RS{6&2&1&5&3-4} 
The regression tree analysis produces results that are parallel to the 
results from the stepwise regression model.  As seen in Figure 56, the mean 
aggregated escalation is 498.0 when rulesets other than Gandhi Strategy are 
used, while the mean aggregated escalation rises to 2227.2 if the Gandhi 
Strategy is adopted. Apparently, Ruleset 4, which always tries to pacify 
regardless of the civilians’ actions, is not an appropriate policy if the PSU wants 
to keep the escalation low. 
The absence of duty posts produces the worst case if Ruleset 4 is 
adopted and disturbers’ readiness for aggression is above a certain level 
(Dist/RFA >= 28). 
The models produced by both of the techniques are satisfactory in two 
aspects. First of all, both models explain almost 80% of the variability in 
aggregated escalation while using a relatively small number of terms. Secondly, 
the factors that stand out as important in the models are mainly controllable 
variables. Rulesets, the presence of duty posts, homogeneity and the size of the 
group are factors that can be changed.  The PSUs can definitely choose the 
appropriate rulesets for the soldiers and train them accordingly. They can build 
as many duty posts as they wish, and wherever they like. At the first sight, it is 
not intuitive how the homogeneity and size of the civilian group can be affected.  
However, building more polling stations and assigning fewer people to vote in 
each station would decrease the number of people that show up in each station. 
If building more polling stations is expensive, perhaps the election could be 
carried out in more than a single day, and the time windows when people can 
vote might be coordinated. When planning who will vote at which station, 
ethnicity, religion and other factors might be taken into consideration to keep the 
groups homogeneous. 
  
Figure 56.   Aggregated Escalation Regression Tree  
 
2. Investigating the Escalation at the End of the Simulation 
The aggregated escalation is the accumulated escalation during the 
simulation. PAX also provides escalation levels according to groups and areas. 
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However, these correspond to the escalation levels at the end of the simulation. 
Before making comparisons between groups and areas, it is useful to investigate 
the total escalation at the end of the simulation.  
The stepwise regression produces a 31 term model with R2 = 0.868. After 
removing many of the terms, a seven term model with R2 = 0.767 is selected. 
This final model has four main and three interaction terms. Having R2 drop 0.1 as 
the penalty for removing 13 terms from the model is affordable. Figure 57 shows 
the parameter estimates for the escalation at the end of the simulation.  
The term RO/RS{6&2&1&5&3-4} is once again the most important factor. 
However, rulesets for reserve soldiers located inside the election area, and 
rulesets for admission control soldiers, do not appear in the final model. This 
clearly shows that special attention should be paid to activities outside the 
election area.  By not using Ruleset 4 for reserve soldiers located outside the 
election area, the escalation might be dropped as much as 8.272. The next most 
important factor in the model was the absence of the duty posts. Building duty 
posts would decrease the escalation as much as 0.699.  
   
Figure 57.   Parameter Estimates for the Escalation at the End of the Simulation 
 
The model for the escalation at the end of the simulation can be written as  
Esc_end = 7.4651364 + 0.1331315 * x1 + 0.698751 * x2 – 0.036911 * x3 - 
8.272307 * x4 – 0.1336 * ((x1 – 30) * (x4 – 0.6)) – 1.802664 * (x2 * (x4 – 0.6)) + 
0.1098718 * ((x3 – 50.0308) * (x4 – 0.6))  
where: x1 = CivSize 
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  x2 = DutyPosts[No] 
  x3 = Voters/Anger 
  x4 = RO/RS{6&2&1&5&3-4} 
The regression tree produces parallel results. As seen in Figure 58, the 
rulesets for reserve soldiers shows up as the most important effect.  The mean 
escalation at the end of the simulation drops to 1.344 when Ruleset 4 is not 
adopted by reserve soldiers located outside the election area, and rises to 
18.333013 if Ruleset 4 is adopted.  
Another interesting result is that if voters are really angry, the ruleset that 
reserve soldiers uses does not matter that much.  As seen in Figure 58, even 
though Ruleset 4 is chosen, if the voters’ initial anger level is very high (above 
89), then the mean of the escalation at the end becomes 6.506. That means if 
the voters are really angry Ruleset 4 works to keep the escalation low, too. 
However, it makes escalation higher than the other rulesets. In the worst case in 
which Ruleset 4 is used, when the voters’ initial anger is below 89, the mean of 
escalation rises to 26.728.  The prediction profiler supports this statement as 
well. As seen in Figure 59 and 60, using Ruleset 4 decreases the escalation 
when voters’ anger is higher than 87.   
 
Figure 58.   Regression Tree for the Escalation at the End of the Simulation 
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Figure 59.   Escalation at the End When Voters/Anger = 50 and Rule Set = 4  
 
Figure 60.   Escalation at the End When Voters/Anger = 95 and Rule Set = 4  
 
3. Investigating Escalation Outside of the Election Area 
Civilians enter polling stations through security check points. They face 
the reserve soldiers outside the election area before they go through 
checkpoints. Furthermore, they meet other civilians from either an opposing 
group or a friendly group. During this process they might become more (or less) 
agitated, scared or angry. Their actions in the election area might be affected by 
this process. Therefore, the pattern of escalation outside the election area is 
investigated more deeply. 
The stepwise regression produces a model with 24 terms, including ten 
main effects. The R2 is 0.838. Manually removing some terms produces a 12 
term model, involving six main effects, with R2 = 0.793.  Figure 61 shows the 
factors and the estimates, respectively.  
Similar to the aggregated escalation model, the terms 
RO/RS{6&2&1&5&3-4} and DistRatio stand as the most important factors. 
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Ruleset 4 is again the worst choice. A large DistRatio, a large group, and 
absence of duty posts trigger the escalation outside the election area.   
 
Figure 61.   Parameter Estimates for Escalation outside Election Area 
The model for escalation outside the election area is similar to the model 
for aggregated escalation. Nearly the same factors appear in the model. The only 
factor that differs from the aggregated escalation model is the Voter/Anger, which 
replaced the term Voter/RFA. The model can be summarized as  
Esc_out = 3.3475689 + 0.1211714 * x1 + 0.6088934 * x2 + 5.3429392 * x3 
- 0.02427 * x4 + 0.0246165 * x5 – 8.238161 * x6 – 0.129657 * ((x1 - 30) * (x6 – 
0.6)) – 1.726212 * (x2 * (x6 – 0.6)) + 0.3451086 * ((x3 – 0.415) * ( x6 – 0.6)) - 
13.39954 * ((x3 – 0.415) * ( x6 – 0.6)) + 0.0695162 * ((x4 – 50.0308) * ( x6 – 0.6)) - 
0.053035 * ((x5 – 50.0308) * ( x6 – 0.6)) 
where : x1 = CivSize 
  x2 = DutyPosts[No] 
  x3 = DistRatio 
  x4 = Voters/Anger 
  x5 = Dist/RFA 
  x6 = RO/RS{6&2&1&5&3-4} 
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The regression tree for the escalation outside the election area produces 
parallel results to stepwise regression. As shown in Figure 62, adopting any 
ruleset other than 4 would keep the escalation very low. Mean escalation rises to 
0.9889634 if Ruleset 4 is not adopted. If so, mean escalation rises to 16.727. As 
evidenced one more time, Ruleset 4 is not appropriate if lower escalation is 
desired. 
 
Figure 62.   Regression Tree for the Escalation Outside of the Election Area.  
77 
4. Investigating Escalation Inside the Election Area 
The election area is where the polling booths are established. It is the last 
location where civilians can interact with each other and with PSU soldiers. Any 
incidents that occur in this area could jeopardize the voting process, so special 
attention should be paid to the activities in the election area. In particular, 
escalation might scare the voters and make them leave without voting. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to look more deeply into the escalation level within the 
election area. 
The stepwise regression produces a model with R2 of 0.790. The model 
includes eight main terms and six interaction terms. The ruleset for reserve 
soldiers located inside the election area to watch the election process stands as 
the most important factor. Ruleset 4 was the worst choice one more time. Any 
ruleset other than 4 lowered the escalation in the election area.  Figure 63 shows 
the parameter estimates for escalation in the election area. 
 
Figure 63.   Parameter Estimates for Escalation Inside the Election Area 
The fear level of the voters has an important impact on the escalation 
inside. If the civilians begin the day more fearful, then they tend to run away from 
the soldiers and find a shelter for safety. Therefore not many interactions happen 
between civilians and soldiers. This actually explains the impact of the voters' 
fear level. As the fear level increases, the escalation tends to decrease.  
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Although it is not one of the driving forces, the ratio of disturbers shows up 
in this model as well. Unlike the other models, a high ratio of disturbers works to 
keep the escalation in the election area down. In fact, this is not surprising, 
because the admission control soldiers do not allow disturbers to enter into the 
election area. If there are more disturbers in the theater, there will be more 
people left outside. The fewer the people in the election area, the lower the 
escalation.  
Another point is that even in one of the worst case scenarios, which is 
adopting Ruleset 4 when the voters are not that fearful, the escalation inside 
rises to a maximum value of 10.812, as shown in Figure 64. Compared to the 
escalation level at the end of the simulation with the worst case of 26.728, it is 
clear that most of the interactions took place outside the election area. This 
supports an earlier statement that special attention should be paid to the outside 
of the election area. 
 
Figure 64.   Escalation Inside Election Area When Rule Set = 4 and Voters are Not 
Fearful 
 
The model for escalation inside the election area can be written as 
Esc_in = 5.5676626 – 2.152505 * x1 - 0.031726 * x2 + 0.0066897 * x3 - 
0.01499 * x4 + 0.0814076 * x5 + 0.2232854 * x6 + 0.517195 * x7 – 2.158215 * x8 
+ 4.414488 * ((x1 – 0.415) * (x8 – 0.6)) + 0.0810541 * ((x2 – 65.0154) * (x8 – 0.6)) – 
0.013283 * ((x3 – 50.0308) * (x8 – 0.6)) + 0.0370481 * ((x4 – 50.0308) – 0.567198 * 
((x6 + 0.10769) * (x8 – 0.6)) – 1.271246 * ((x7 - 0.09231) * (x8 – 0.6)) 
where: x1 = DistRatio 
  x2 = Voters/Fear 
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  x3 = Voters/EM 
  x4 = Dist/GC 
  x5 = AC/RS{6&3&2 – 4&5&1} 
  x6 = AC/RS{4 - 5&1} 
  x7 = AC/RS{5 - 1} 
  x8 = RI/RS{6&2&1&5&3-4} 
 
5. Investigating the Ratio of Votes   
The main focus of this work is to evaluate the participation of the Sunni 
population in an election.  It is expected that in a large group, the turnout (in 
number of votes) would be larger. The more potential voters who show up in 
election area, the more votes are expected. In order to avoid having this situation 
mask the most important effects, the MOE is the ratio of votes to the number of 
voters, instead of the number of votes.  
   The final model includes 17 terms: 13 main terms and four interaction 
terms. The R2 value is 0.834. Figure 65 shows the parameter effects and the 
estimates, respectively.  
Not surprisingly, the initial anger level (Voters/Anger) and election 
motivation (Voters/EM) stand out as the two most important factors. If a civilian 
starts with a high election motivation he tends to end up voting. The higher the 
initial anger level, the lower the turnout. Although these two factors are 
considered uncontrollable variables, it might be possible to affect them by long-
term efforts before Election Day. Gaining the trust of the population, explaining 
the virtues of democracy, making them believe that the election is for their own 
good, and treating them in a friendly manner could increase the election 
motivation and decrease the anger level on the day of the election.  
 
 
Figure 65.   Parameter Estimates for Escalation Outside the Election Area 
 
Among the controllable variables that show up in the model, civilian size 
has the biggest impact on the turnout. In a relatively large group, agents tend not 
to cast their votes as often as they do in smaller groups.  As seen in Figures 66 
and 67, in a large group 13.43% of the voters vote. The turnout rises to 28.03% 
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As seen in the prediction profiles in Figures 66 and 67, the slopes in the 
first three cells are steeper.  These correspond to civilian size, anger level and 
the election motivation of the voters. This shows that the first three terms have 
the biggest effects on the turnout.  Actually, when the model is fit by just adding 
these three terms, the R2 is 0.741.  These three terms alone explain nearly 75% 
of the variability in the ratio of the votes to the number of voters. 
The only term with a relatively high p-value in the model is RO/RS{1&4-6}. 
JMP divides the rulesets of the reserve soldiers outside the election area into 
four groups. In order to have the rulesets that show up in later partitions, the 
RO/RS{1&4-6} had to be included because further removal of the rulesets that 
showed up in later partitions causes the R2 to drop significantly. Furthermore, 
including rulesets separately in the model helps in investigating the impact of the 
each ruleset separately. 
At the first partition, JMP divided the rulesets of reserve soldiers that were 
located outside the election area into two groups. Rulesets 5 and 3 formed the 
first group. Rulesets 1, 4, 6 and 2 formed the other group. At first glance, 
employing Ruleset 5 or 3 appeared to be the worst choice.  However, by looking 
at the aggregate effect after considering all ruleset terms, Ruleset 4 appears to 
be the worst choice one more time. Adopting Ruleset 4 drops the ratio of votes 
cast by as much as 0.044. On the other hand, Ruleset 1 (based on rules of 
engagement from the UN Peace Operation Manual) shows up as the best 
choice. Ruleset 2 also has a positive effect on the turnout ratio. Using Ruleset 1 
or 5 for admission control soldiers, and Ruleset 5 for reserve soldiers located in 
the election area, produces positive impacts on the ratio of votes. The effects of 
all terms can be seen in the scaled estimates displayed at the bottom of Figure 
68. 
 
Figure 68.   Scaled Estimates for Ratio of Votes 
The final model can be written as 
Ratio_Votes = -0.39416 – 0.007302 * x1 - 0.004 * x2 + 0.0039616 * x3 – 
0.011629 * x4 – 0.027221 * x5 + 0.0119722 * x6 + 0.0442379 * x7 - 0.030354 * x8 
+  0.0219543 * x9 – 0.017668 * x10 – 0.019527 * x11 – 0.020061 * x12 + 0.0342497 
* x13 + 0.0001291 * ((x1 – 30)*(x2 – 50.0308)) – 0.000059 * ((x2 – 50.0308) * (x3 -
50.0308)) – 0.002896 * ((x2 – 50.0308) * ( x7 + 0.09231)) – 0.06666 * ((x9 + 
0.07692) * (x13 – 0.09231))  
where : x1 = CivSize 
  x2 = Voter/Anger 
  x3 = Voter/EM 
  x4 = RO/RS{5&3-1&4&6&2} 
  x5 = RO/RS{1&4&6-2} 
  x6 = RO/RS{1&4-6} 
  x7 = RO/RS{1- 4} 
  x8 = AC/RS{1&5&3&4 – 2&6} 
  x9 = AC/RS{1&5 - 3&4} 
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  x10 = RI/RS{3&2 - 6&5&1&4} 
  x11 = AC/RS{6&5&1 - 4} 
  x12 = AC/RS{6 – 5&1} 
  x13 = AC/RS{ 5 - 1} 
The regression tree gives almost the same results. As seen in Figure 69, if 
agents start with an election motivation less than 17, hardly anyone casts a vote. 
If agents are willing to vote, they end up voting more enthusiastically in smaller 
groups. In a large group, 27.5% of the voters actually cast votes. The ratio is 
55.28% in a relatively small group. 
  
Figure 69.   Regression Tree for Ratio of Votes 
 
6. Investigating Attacks Against Civilians Conducted by Civilians  
Although PAX does not provide the number of attacks conducted by 
groups separately, it reports the total number of attacks conducted by civilians 
regardless of the groups. The attacks conducted by civilians comprise most of 
the escalation. If they can be prevented, escalation can be kept at low levels.  
The final model includes six main and five interaction terms. The R2 value 
is 0.775. It is very rewarding to observe that the rulesets of reserve soldiers 
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located outside, which is a controllable variable, has the biggest impact in the 
model. Figure 70 shows the parameter estimates of the model.  
 
Figure 70.   Parameter Estimates for Attacks on Civilians by Civilians  
Any ruleset other than Ruleset 4 results in a low number of attacks. 
Ruleset 4 shows up as the worst policy yet again. As seen in the prediction 
profilers displayed in Figures 71 and 72, rulesets other than 4 caused a low 
number of attacks (around 32). Ruleset 4 increased that number to 243.  
 
Figure 71.   Number of Attacks to Civilians by Civilians when Rule Set = 6&2&1&5&3 
 
Figure 72.   Number of Attacks on Civilians by Civilians when Rule Set = 4 
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 The other controllable variables—civilian size, absence of duty posts and 
ratio of disturbers—also show up in the final model, although they have minor 
effects. While large group and a large ratio of disturbers increase escalation, 
building duty posts for the reserve soldiers decreases the number of attacks. The 
model can be written as  
Attacks_civ_civ = -52.90878 + 1.58866619 * x1 + 9.8813623 * x2 + 
66.614821 * x3 + 0.7063195 * x4 + 1.1801725 * x5 – 87.62491 * x6 + 0.0329141 * 
((x1 - 30) * (x5 – 50.0308)) – 17.64707 * (x2 * (x6 – 0.6)) + 4.948296 * ((x3 – 0.415) 
* ( x5 – 50.0308)) - 0.845807 * ((x4 – 50.0308) * ( x6 – 0.6)) - 1.540822 * ((x5 – 
50.0308) * ( x6 – 0.6)) 
where: x1 = CivSize 
  x2 = DutyPosts[No] 
  x3 = DistRatio 
  x4 = Voters/RFA 
  x5 = Dist/RFA 
  x6 = RO/RS{6&2&1&5&3-4} 
 
7. Investigating Average Readiness for Aggression  
Leaving people unsatisfied, angry and ready for aggression contradicts 
the long term goals of the PSU. First of all, having a large number of people who 
are angry and ready for aggression is a threat to the security of PSU itself. 
Secondly, these kinds of people are more likely to cause problems for other 
civilians. Therefore, it is desirable that as few people as possible be left angry at 
the end of the operation. Discussion now turns to an investigation of the level of 
readiness for aggression at the end of the simulation. 
The final model accounts for almost all of the variability in average 
readiness for regression. The R2 term is 0.97. Moreover, the model is simple:  it 
include just five terms, three of which are main effects and two of which are 
interaction terms. However, it is apparent that the PSU unit has little ability to 
decrease the readiness for aggression. The terms that have the biggest impact in 
the model are the initial readiness for aggression of the voters and the initial 
readiness for aggression of the disturbers, both of which are uncontrollable 
variables.  The only controllable variable that shows up in the model is the ratio 
of the disturbers, and it has only a minor effect. Figure 73 shows the scaled 
estimates.   
 
Figure 73.   Scaled Estimates for RFA 
 
The model can be represented as  
Avg_RFA = -3.4518 + 4.3030879 * x1 + 0.5949596 * x2 + 0.3479126 * x3 – 
1.45796 * ((x1 – 0.415) * (x2 -50.0308)) + 1.4659532 * ((x1 – 0.415) * (x3 -
50.0308)) 
where : x1 = DistRatio 
  x2 = Voter/RFA 
  x3 = Dist/RFA 
 
The regression tree produces almost the same result.  As Figure 74 
shows, the voters’ initial readiness for aggression and the disturbers’ initial 
readiness for aggression are the only two factors that appear.   
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Figure 74.   Regression Tree for RFA  
 
F. A COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO CASES 
So far, in our analysis we have seen that large civilian sizes, high disturber 
ratios and absence of duty posts yield undesired results. To give more tangible 
insights to the reader we take a birds-eye view of two cases: a good case and a 
not-so-good case. In the former, a small group of relatively homogeneous 
civilians go to the polls (DistRatio is low). Additionally, PSU soldiers are protected 
by duty posts. Conversely, for the bad case the PSU deals with a larger group 
and does not have the protected duty posts. There is a higher proportion of 
disturbers as well. We will compare the changes in average readiness for 
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aggression, average anger and average fear among all civilians during the 
course of the simulation. Ideally, the change in average values would negative 
for RFA, fear, and anger.  This might improve the prospects of successful peace 
support operations in the future.   
Although PAX does not report average initial RFA, average initial anger, 
and average initial fear among all civilians, we can represent these values by 
adding three more columns to the output data set. Multiplying the initial RFA of 
disturbers, the civilian size, and the disturbers’ ratio gives the total initial RFA for 
disturbers. Similarly, the product of the initial RFA of voters, the civilian size, and 
voters’ ratio (equal to 1 - the disturbers’ ratio) gives the total initial RFA among 
voters. Dividing the sum of the total initial RFA of disturbers and the total initial 
RFA of voters by civilian size gives the average initial RFA among all civilians. 
Finally, the difference between the average RFA at the end of the simulation and 
the initial average RFA gives the change in average RFA among all civilians. 
Changes in average anger and fear are acquired in a similar manner.  
As we see in Figures 75 and 76, in both the good and bad cases the 
change in average RFA is generally below zero.  This means that average RFA 
among all civilians at the end of the simulation tends to be lower than the 
average initial RFA. In other terms, RFA tends to decrease during the simulation. 
However, unlike average RFA, average fear and average anger tend to increase 
during the simulation. The dark shaded columns in each of the graphs represent 
the positive changes – the increases in average RFA, average anger and 
average fear. Although both cases seem to produce similar results, there are 
some differences worth mentioning.  
 
 
Figure 75.   Change in RFA, Anger and Fear (Bad Case)  
 
The mean of the change in RFA in the bad case is -3.888 while it is -5.255 
in the good case. This difference may be minor. However, the mean of the 
changes in average anger and fear in the bad case are almost double the 
corresponding values in the good case:  19.927 vs. 9.907 for the change in 
average anger, and 33.425 vs. 17.219 for the change in average fear. The 
average anger decreased for more than 25% of the observations in the good 
case. On the other hand, it increased for more than 90% of the observations in 
the bad case. Furthermore, the increase in average anger is over 10 for more 
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than 75% of the observations in the bad case, while it is less than 10 in more 
than 50% of the observations in the good case.  
Similar to the change in average anger, the change in average fear 
increases for more than 90% of the simulation runs in the bad case. While the 
ranges of potential changes in fear are essentially the same, many more 
situations (over 25%) resulted in decreased fear for the good case. 
 
 
Figure 76.   Change in RFA, Anger and Fear (Good Case)  
 
One could argue that if the situation may be bad in either case, why 
should the PSU worry too much about how to safeguard the election? 
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Considering the situation in Iraq, there are a lot of things to worry about. Since 
the start of the Operation Iraqi Freedom, thousands of people lost their lives - 
most of whom are innocent civilians. The ones who managed to survive are living 
in miserable conditions and worrying about their own and their beloveds’ lives. It 
is obvious that the more angry and fearful the people are, the more aggressive 
they may become.  Any measure that can save a life, hinder an attack or lessen 
the aggressiveness is worthwhile, regardless of how much it costs.   The results 
of our simulation study show that PSU rule sets and other measures can improve 
the situation.  Follow-on work may reveal additional tactics, techniques, or 
procedures that can lead to further improvements.  The results also emphasize 
the importance of efforts to influence civilian behavior before the Election Day.  
For example, some civilian leaders might be able to reduce the anger or 
fearfulness of their group, increase their groups’ norms for anti-aggression, or 
keep potential disturbers farther from the polling areas.  Our results show that the 
results of these actions would be a safer election with a higher proportion of 
potential voters casting their votes. 
 
G. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
In this chapter, several MOEs are investigated to gain insights about how 
they can be influenced by the tactics and procedures of the PSU, the number of 
civilians present, the presence or absence of duty posts, and different ratios of 
the number of disturbers to the number of voters. For each MOE investigated, 
models were built using stepwise regression and regression tree techniques. The 
MOEs investigated are:  
• aggregated escalation, 
• escalation at the end of the simulation, 
• escalation outside the election area at the end of the simulation, 
• escalation inside the election area at the end of the simulation, 
• ratio of number of votes to the number of voters, 
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• attacks conducted by civilians against civilians, and 
• average readiness for aggression among all civilians.   
The models are satisfactory. In each model, most of the variability of the 
response is explained by the regressors in the model. For instance, the model for 
average RFA among all civilians covers almost 97% of the variability. The model 
that has the lowest R2 is the model for escalation inside the election area. The R2 
value for that model is 0.77, which is still a high value. Main effects, quadratic 
effects and interaction terms were added to the models before running stepwise 
regression. However, quadratic effects never show up in the final models. 
Generally, the final models contain main effects and a small number of 
interaction terms. 
The other satisfactory side of the models is that in all models but 
Avg_RFA, the controllable variables stand as the most important factors. This 
means it is possible to simultaneously increase the ratio of the votes and keep 
escalation low by adopting particular policies or strategies.  
Table 1 gives a summary of the effects in each model. A plus sign (+) 
means the corresponding factor has a positive effect on the model, whereas a 
minus sign (-) implies the opposite. For example, while it is desirable for the ratio 
of votes to be high, the escalation should be low. If a factor has a “+” in both 
columns, this means that factor helps to keep the ratio of votes high and the 
escalation low.  
The larger civilian group size, appearing in five of the seven models, 
always has a negative effect on the MOEs. This means that situations involving 
larger groups tend to be worse than those involving relatively small groups. For 
example, civilians tend to vote at higher rates in smaller groups. The ratio of 
votes increased two times in smaller groups compared to larger groups.  
Although the impact of civilian group size is not as dramatic for the escalation 
model, it is still beneficial.  Smaller group sizes tend to keep the escalation 
substantially lower.    
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The presence of duty posts has positive effects in all models where it 
appears. It shows up in four of the seven models. In situations where duty posts 
were built, escalation decreased drastically. Although this thesis did not 
investigate where and how many duty posts should be built, their presence 
clearly helps keep the escalation down. 
A large ratio of disturbers has negative effects in all but one of the five 
models in which it appears.  It decreases the escalation, except for escalation 
inside the election area. In scenarios that include more people from opposing 
groups, attacks from one group on another rose significantly. Lower ratios of 
disturbers caused low levels of RFA for all civilians, which can be used as an 
indicator of long term effect.  There is a reasonable explanation for its positive 
effect on escalation inside election areas. Disturbers were not allowed to enter to 
election areas by admission control soldiers. In groups with large ratios of 
disturbers, more people were left outside the election area. Because they were 
outside, they could not create havoc inside. 
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R2 0.779 0.767 0.793 0.790 0.834 0.776 0.966
CivSize - - - - - 
DutyPosts + + + + 
DistRatio -  - + - - 
RO/RS{6&2&1&5&3-4} + + + + 
RO/RS{5&3}  - 
RO/RS{2}  +  













AC/RS{1&5 - 3&4} + 
Voters/Anger + + - 
Voters/Fear + 
Voters/EM - + 
Voters/RFA - - - 
Dist/RFA - - - - 
Dist/GC + 
 
Table 1.   Summary of the effects in all models 
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Rulesets used by PSU soldiers show up in all models except for Average 
RFA among all civilians. Rulesets for reserve soldiers located outside of the 
election area play more important roles that those for other soldiers. The term 
RO/RS{6&2&1&5&3-4} has positive effects in all models of escalation, which 
means rulesets other than Ruleset 4 (Gandhi Strategy) do a better job of keeping 
escalation low. This means that means adopting any ruleset other that 4 
produces better results.  Considering the ratio of votes, Ruleset 1 (built on the 
Peace Support Operation Manual) turns out to be the most appropriate choice. 
Ruleset 2 also improves the proportion of votes cast. However, the rest of the 
rulesets have negative effects on the ratio of votes. Rulesets for admission 
control and reserve soldiers located inside the election area do not matter so 
much. They have very small effects on the escalation inside the election area, or 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this thesis, a representative Iraqi town was created using the agent-
based model PAX. The peace support operation examined in this thesis was 
safeguarding the operation of elections. Eight scenarios were developed and run 
with the help of OldMcData, data farming software created by the MITRE 
Corporation. After each run, OldMcData provided an output file of the simulation. 
The output files were concatenated into one output file. The results have been 
analyzed by statistical software JMP. 
This author does not predict what will happen in an election held in Iraq. 
But some useful insights might be provided to decision makers as a result of the 
analysis done here. Additionally, the experience of conducting these experiments 
and some of the problems that occurred during the research process allows 
some useful feedback to be provided to the developers of model PAX. 
 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS TO DECISION MAKERS  
Peace support operations are different in character than conventional war. 
Therefore the modeling tools should be used wisely. Attrition-based models that 
were primarily developed to model traditional combat may not be suitable to 
represent the most important aspect of peace support operations. The first and 
most important distinguishing characteristic of peace support operation is that 
there is no enemy to kill and the people the soldiers are dealing with are civilians. 
Although a relatively new model and still under development, the PAX model is 
an important step toward representing peace support operations. 
Because the participants are not armed forces, special tactics and 
procedures must be followed. As this study shows, different tactics and 
procedures have different impacts on the outcomes. A tactic that is suitable for 
one scenario may not work well in another.  
Decision makers do not have many parameters that they can control. Most 
of the parameters are human related. However, as this study demonstrates, 
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these controllable variables, though limited, may play significant roles in peace 
support operations. Smaller groups sizes give better results; in particular, small 
group sizes produce less escalation and higher turnouts. Although it does not 
affect the number of votes, the presence of duty posts decreases the escalation 
significantly.   Additionally, keeping the civilian groups homogeneous helps the 
PSU to establish security more easily.  
The PSUs can definitely choose the appropriate rule sets for the soldiers 
and train them accordingly. They can build as many duty posts as they wish, and 
wherever they like. At the first sight, it is not intuitive how the homogeneity and 
size of the civilian group can be affected.  However, building more polling 
stations and assigning fewer people to vote in each station would decrease the 
number of people that show up in each station. If building more polling stations is 
expensive, perhaps the election could be carried out in more than a single day, 
and the time windows when people can vote might be coordinated. When 
planning who will vote at which station, ethnicity, religion and other factors might 
be taken into consideration to keep the groups homogeneous. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATION TO PAX DEVELOPERS  
PAX is a model that was developed for peace support operations after it 
was recognized that such operations are not suitably simulated in current 
attrition-based models. It takes human behavioral patterns into consideration, 
making it unique. It is a relatively new model and its development process is 
ongoing. In the 10th Project Albert International Workshop, the developers 
introduced a new, stochastic version of PAX. The new version also includes 
some other features, such as pushing/shoving, and reporting the MOEs 
according to the groups and areas. However, the model still needs enhancement.  
All models are abstractions, and no model can simulate an operation perfectly. 
But for PAX to be useful for broad investigations into peace support operations, it 
should offer users some additional features. Some problems confronted during 
the experiments reported in this thesis are listed below for the benefit of the PAX 
developers.   
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1. Different Agent Types 
In PAX, there are three agent types that can be assigned:  civilian, soldier 
and service point. Although these are the main actors in peace operations, there 
are other entities that play important roles. Before the 30 January elections, more 
than 500 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) emerged in Iraq to deal with 
just women’s issues.33 Of course, it is impossible to model all types of entities. 
However, some important organizations and agencies, like health organizations 
and the media and press, should be taken into consideration.  
 
2. Leader Situation 
In group dynamics, a leader's presence and attitude have considerable 
impact on individual behaviors. PAX provides the opportunity to investigate the 
presence of a civilian leader. Initially, this researcher intended to explore the 
different attitudes of the leader. A question of particular interest was if 
participation could be increased by persuading a leader to support (or at least not 
hinder) the election. But the interaction between soldiers and leaders is limited. If 
escalation reaches a certain threshold, soldiers will approach the leader and ask 
him to encourage his men to leave the area. Whether this is successful will vary 
according to the situation, since each individual will decide whether they will obey 
the leader or refuse his proposal.  So if the group causing problems has a civilian 
leader, the leader may help deescalate the situation within the election area.  
In PAX, one is able to model more than one group of civilians. Each group 
may have a leader. In these experiments, however, the voters are the only group 
with a leader.  If escalation occurs, the soldiers will approach this leader and 
request that he tell his men to leave the area, even if the trouble was caused by 
another group. This is not optimal. If a group is associating with soldiers and 
doing well, it is desirable that they continue doing so.  In such cases, the soldiers 
 
33 Iraq Elections: Road to Democracy, p 24. U.S Department of State Bureau of International 
Information Programs, Retrieved July 20, 2005 from 
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/iraqelect/iraqelect.pdf
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should be encouraging the leader to ask his men to vote, not to ask his men to 
leave.  
PAX currently reports MOEs according to groups and areas. This means it 
tracks which group is causing problems (i.e., which group is threatening or 
attacking the soldiers). Therefore, it should be relatively easy to have the soldiers 
seek out the leaders of the disturbing group.  Allowing the soldiers to use 
different types of communications for leaders of different groups would also be 
useful.  
 
3. Escalation and Closing the Gates 
Civilians enter the election area if their leading internal state is motivation 
to participate in the election and if they belong to a group that is allowed to enter. 
There are no mechanisms to control flow into or out of the election area.  In the 
model simulations, situations arose where agents kept entering the election area 
even when there was a lot of escalation. In a real situation, if escalation goes 
way up, one of the first things that the PSU commander would do is to close the 
gates and wait for the escalation to abate. If the flow could be controlled, the 
situation would be more realistically represented.  
 
4. Custom Parameters 
Advanced features, like enabling groups to enter the election area, and 
tracking the number of civilians who passed the check points, and when they do 
so, can be edited by using the Custom Parameters option. This option allows 
users to exploit the advanced features of PAX. However, it is not clear how the 
custom parameters options can be implemented. The online manual does not 
say anything about this topic. Furthermore, the fields must be entered in German. 
These problems make the Custom Parameters option impractical for non-
German speakers. Fortunately, the developers were able and willing to help in 
the use of these advanced features, but if they could be selected from a menu, 
like other features, then more users could benefit from them more easily. In 
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addition to or instead of these enhancements, updating the online manual would 
help users to understand and use the advanced features. 
 
C. FUTURE WORK 
Follow-on work may reveal additional tactics, techniques, or procedures 
that can lead to further improvements.  The results also emphasize the 
importance of efforts to influence civilian behavior before the Election Day.  For 
example, some civilian leaders might be able to reduce the anger or fearfulness 
of their group, increase their groups’ norms for anti-aggression, or keep potential 
disturbers farther from the polling areas.  Our results show that the results of 
these actions would be a safer election with a higher proportion of potential 
voters casting their votes. 
As stated above, the controllable parameters are limited. Future work 
should focus on the effects of different levels of controllable parameters.  The 
controllable variables can be summarized as  
• Different tactics and procedures (rulesets) of soldiers 
• Number and location of PSU soldiers 
• Number and location of duty posts 
• Different ratios of number of disturbers to number of voters 
In addition to a more detailed study of these controllable variables, the 
presence of leaders and their attitudes could be investigated more deeply if the 
developers update the model PAX accordingly.   
 
D.  SUMMARY  
What we once thought of as purely civilian considerations are today 
increasingly significant in conflict situations. Conflicts within states and 
engagements that involve urban encounters make civilian considerations 
particularly worthy of military attention. The international community has reached 
a consensus on democracy as form of government, but new democracies tend to 
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be unstable. It is particularly vital that international actors assisting societies in 
transition help those nations to choose their own democratic government 
structures and leadership.  
For these reasons, the techniques militaries use must change. Stability 
operations are an application of military power to influence the political and 
civilian environment.  Often these stability operations take the form of 
peacekeeping or peace support operations. Peace Support Operations (PSO) 
are military operations to support and sustain a long-term political settlement. 
PSO and conventional war have different characteristics. The main purpose of 
conventional war can be generalized as “defeat the enemy,” whereas 
peacekeeping attempts to “win the peace.”  At the level of tactics, the goals of 
peacekeeping missions are to help and protect civilians, avoid violence and 
escalation, ensure the safety of the public, and so on. Stability operations are 
executed in a more diverse range of environments than are the operations of 
conventional war. Finally, depending upon the mandate, the engagement rules 
for soldiers are different when they interact with civilians in a stability operation 
as opposed to in combat. This thesis demonstrated an example of how ABMs 
can be used to provide insights to PSUs about appropriate tactics for successful 
peace support operations. Future work may reveal additional tactics, techniques, 
or procedures that can lead to further improvements. 
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